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INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 2011, the last tower of the Cabrini Green public housing complex
crumbled to the ground. The city of Chicago had gradually razed the near North Side
project since 1995 but the destruction of the last tower seemed to signal the end of an era.
For decades, violence, gangs, drugs, poverty, and deterioration plagued the project.
Snipers perched in a high-rise shot and killed two police officers in 1970. Stray gun
bullets struck and killed a seven-year-old as he walked to school with his mother in 1992.
Vacant units were not repaired or refilled. Gangs and squatters moved in. Elevators were
broken and graffiti covered the walls. By the time of its demolishment, Cabrini Green had
come to symbolize everything terrible about Chicago public housing. These problems
were by no means confined to Cabrini Green. Other projects like the Henry Horner
Homes in the West Side and the notorious Robert Taylor Homes in the South Side were
afflicted by the same problems. By 1995, Chicago public housing developments made up
eleven of the fifteen poorest census tracts in the United States.1
Cabrini Green’s dysfunction is a metaphor for the entire system of public housing
in Chicago. The organization responsible for maintaining public housing, the Chicago
Housing Authority (CHA) created a system that concentrated low-income African
American families in chaotic, disorganized, and very often violent communities. The
CHA’s failed housing policies created a system that segregated and isolated African
Americans from the decentralizing metropolitan economy. African Americans living in

1

Ben Austen, “The Last Tower.” Harpers Magazine, May 2012,
http://harpers.org/archive/2012/05/the-last-tower/1/ (accessed February 14, 2013); Susan
Saulny, “At Housing Project, Both Fear and Renewal,” The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/us/18cabrini.html (accessed, February 23, 2013).
1

these projects experienced a living standard most would consider unconscionable in the
world’s wealthiest nation. Political manipulation, white residential resistance, and
structural design failures all played a role in the evolution of the CHA from providing
affordable housing to state enforced segregation financed by the taxpayers. The great
irony is the CHA once was an agency determined to create sustainable and integrated
communities as a means of social mobility for poor and working class families. A wellintentioned effort to house low-income families went drastically awry. The CHA is now
beginning to recognize the system of segregation, violence, and poverty their public
housing policies perpetuated. This thesis is a study of the Chicago Housing Authority and
how over its career reinforced the segregation of African Americans.
Chicago is a city defined by its neighborhoods. The emergence of unique and
vibrant neighborhoods, combined with industrial expansion and immigration, are the
defining trends woven into Chicago’s long and detailed history. Rising to prominence at
the heart of a continental transportation network stretching from the western plains to the
eastern cities, Chicago’s neighborhood development, change, and contestation underlie
the city’s vibrant history and provide essential background for this study. The
contestation of Chicago’s valuable space allowed the city to pioneer methods of racial
containment as a mechanism to control neighborhood transition and the city’s escalating
population.
Throughout the Chicago’s history, waves of immigrants established their own
unique and vibrant enclaves across the city. Eventually, these ethnic quarters gradually
broke up. The story of one minority group is very different, however. As the number of
African Americans in Chicago increased, they were funneled into segregated spaces that

2

would have remarkable durability and permanence. The African American “Black Belt,”
a narrow strip of neighborhoods on the South Side of Chicago, would be home to some of
the largest public housing developments in the city. While Chicago’s South Side African
American neighborhoods present a fascinating potential topic, this thesis is not a story of
the Black Belt or neighborhood change. Instead, this is a story of how a city institution
confined and concealed African Americans to a ghetto, with enduring consequences.2
The abundant literature on race, housing, and the decline of urban America after
World War II provides context for this study. One of the foremost works on these topics
is American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland by Robert Self. Self
describes the rise of the Oakland suburbs and the decline of the inner city through the
context of New Deal liberalism and race. Through urban planning and federal and local
housing policies, Self describes how African Americans were confined to poor
neighborhoods with bad schools, no jobs, and limited access to city services. Thomas
Sugrue continues the discussion of urban decline in his account of postwar Detroit, The
Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit. Sugrue focuses on
deindustrialization and white flight as two primary reasons for the decline of industrial
cities and the disparities in wealth across racial lines. Competition for jobs and housing
from African Americans threatened the Detroit white working class and as African
Americans pushed for housing outside the ghetto, whites felt threatened. Sugrue argues
that the structural roots of urban poverty and racial inequality started in the 1940s and
1950s.

2

The word “ghetto” in this study is used in its original connotation to refer to an area of a
city where a minority group resides due to legal, economic, or social pressures.
3

Neighborhood change, the African American Great Migration and the Catholic
Church is the focus of the John T. McGreevy’s book, Parish Boundaries: The Catholic
Encounter with Race in the Twentieth Century Urban North. McGreevy’s book describes
the creation of ethnic parishes in cities like Chicago and how these ethnic enclaves
changed with the influx of African Americans. The Catholic Church struggled to
reconcile with the newcomers and saw their parishes decline as white ethnics moved to
the suburbs, leaving behind homes, schools, and churches that once were foundations of a
strong community.
A final book provides context on Chicago’s experience with residential
integration and public housing in the postwar decades. Arnold Hirsch’s Making the
Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago 1940-1960 describes the crisis over
housing during the Great Migration and how whites used violence and urban renewal to
keep African Americans confined to the slum neighborhoods of the Black Belt. Crucial to
this study, Making the Second Ghetto argues that public housing became a means to
segregate African Americans and keep them out of white neighborhoods. Racist
politicians restrained the CHA’s liberalism and directed the organization to clear
Chicago’s slums and rebuild them in the form of high-rise public housing developments,
the “second ghetto.” Making the Second Ghetto still resonates today and is the foundation
for this thesis. While Hirsch details the process of racial transition through big business
interests, public housing, neighborhood associations, and white violence, this thesis
instead focuses solely on public housing and the CHA as the institution enforcing African
American segregation.

4

These sources were helpful in explaining the complex issues of neighborhood
change and integration in the urban North. They provide a detailed and compelling
account of the impact of the Great Migration. They were helpful but as a historian, I was
interested in the breakdown of postwar liberalism and the de evolution of the American
plan to use public housing to transform race. Instead public housing became a device that
went from the best of goals to the most despicable.
This thesis presents a new way of thinking about the CHA by examining three
events that changed the course of the organization. Chapter One begins with a history of
Chicago. Located near important geographic features that facilitated the emergence of a
continental transportation network, Chicago was one of the fastest growing cities in the
19th century. It’s constantly increasing population created conflict and neighborhood
change was one manifestation. The arrival of large numbers of African Americans in the
20th century would prove to be a tipping point.
After exploring the historical development of Chicago as the center of a
continental transportation network with a vibrant and diverse ethnic population, Chapter
Two describes the political subjugation of the CHA by the city council in the late 1940s.
A combination of racist politicians and legislation meant to hamper the ability of the
CHA to select locations for public housing severely weakened the CHA’s ability to
provide affordable housing for African Americans outside the ghetto.
Chapter Three describes the story of the first African American family to live in
an all white CHA project in 1953. The story of the Howard family is a demonstration of
the virulent white racism that accompanied any African American family trying to move
into white neighborhoods. The outcome of these race riots would continue to weaken the

5

CHA’s ability to integrate public housing as progressive leaders were eventually fired in
the aftermath.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the CHA went on a binge of public housing
construction almost entirely in African American neighborhoods. Chapter Four describes
the epic legal crusade that ended the CHA’s discriminatory housing patterns. Lasting
nearly twenty years, Gautreaux v. CHA is a dramatic story of proving the CHA’s
discrimination and the complex legal efforts it took to undue decades of segregationist
housing policies.
The Chicago Housing Authority was an institution created to house low-income
people in a decent and safe community. Instead, the CHA evolved into an institution
determined to segregate African Americans. The beginning of this thesis examines the
long and detailed history of Chicago’s immigration, industrialization, and neighborhood
development. The experience of African Americans in Chicago showed how one
minority group’s ethnic enclaves failed to dissolve. Their neighborhoods became a
permanent ghetto. After the political hijacking of the CHA in the 1949-1950 site selection
battles, the CHA was slowly drained of its progressive leadership, paving the way for a
construction boom that produced high-rise towers with thousands of African Americans
packed on top of each other. The disturbances at Trumbull Park in 1953 showed the
depths of white resistance and how violence forced city leaders to abandon wellintentioned efforts to integrate. After the firing of Elizabeth Wood in 1955, the CHA’s
desire to integrate neighborhoods and breakdown the ghetto through public housing
disappeared. Through the public housing boom of the 1950s and 1960s, CHA projects
became increasingly concentrated in African American neighborhoods, limiting their

6

housing opportunity. State sponsored and enforced segregation finally ended with the
Gautreaux victory.
This study traces the segregation of African Americans through the history of the
Chicago Housing Authority. The ever-increasing African American population was
confined to bad neighborhoods with poor schools and concentrated poverty. This
happened because of blatant white racism and a refusal to live near African Americans.
Integration was unthinkable. This thesis uses turning point events as a way to
conceptualize public housing and segregation differently. This is not an uplifting story.
Together, these events provide a disturbing history of Chicago public housing. By
examining the political, individual, and legal anchor events of the Chicago Housing
Authority’s history, this thesis argues that the CHA was instrumental in creating the
African American ghetto. 	
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CHAPTER ONE
CONTESTATION, EXPANSION, AND CONFINEMENT:
A HISTORY OF CHICAGO
Positioned on the southern shores of Lake Michigan, Chicago was situated near a
confluence of important natural features, facilitating economic and population growth.
Chicago’s location made it a place of transportation and trade. The Chicago River flowed
into Lake Michigan, providing access for farmers in the rural hinterland. The division
between the Great Lakes and Mississippi watersheds lay only a few miles west. Rivers
flowing west from this ridge poured into the Mississippi River. Rivers to the east of the
ridge flow toward Lake Michigan.1 The Great Lakes facilitated trade between the
Midwest and East. Close proximity to the Mississippi River watershed allowed trade with
the South. These trading opportunities permitted greater economic growth regional
dominance.
In nearly every era of its history, massive population growth driven by
immigration and emigration characterized Chicago. In the mid 1830s, after its
incorporation as a city, Chicago’s population increased by twentyfold.2 Less than sixty
years after its creation, over one million people resided in Chicago, making the Windy
City the second largest in the nation. This quick expansion was made possible by the
city’s natural waterways, transportation, and geography. As the railroad companies
converged on Chicago, they competed for a share of the economy. Railroad companies

1

William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1991), 24; hereafter cited as Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis.
2
Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, 52.
8

like the Galena and Chicago Union, Illinois Central, and Michigan Central quickly built
branches to Chicago.3 Chicago became a leader in industry as well.
Mass European migration in the late nineteenth century increased the city’s
population. For most of the 18th century, Chicago was an Irish and German city but by
the end of the century, an assortment of ethnic groups resided there. The Irish population
from 1850 to 1870 exploded to almost 40,000.4 Germans were the second largest
minority group. Scandinavians, Italians, Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, and Eastern
European Jews all arrived in large numbers as well. From 1860 to 1870, Chicago’s
population more than doubled, from 112,172 to 298,977. Most new residents were
immigrants or first-generation Americans. In 1890, Chicago’s population was 75 percent
foreign born or children of the foreign born.5 These foreign born residents shaped the
neighborhoods they lived in.
As African Americans arrived in large numbers from 1910 to 1970, their
increasing presence on the South Side threatened Chicago’s hardened ethnic equilibrium.
World War I halted European immigration to Chicago, allowing African Americans to
migrate northward. Higher wages in industrial jobs coupled with increased labor demand
made migration a practical decision.6 The Illinois Central Railroad’s penetration into

3

Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, 68-70.
Dominic Pacyga, Chicago: A Biography, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009),
31; hereafter cited as Pacyga, Chicago.
5
St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a
Northern City (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1945), 8; hereafter cited as
Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis.
6
James R. Grossman, Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great
Migration (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 13-14; hereafter cited as
Grossman, Land of Hope.
4

9

Mississippi provided convenient transportation for rural African Americans as well.7
Mississippi was by far the largest state exporter of African Americans to Chicago and the
social and familial connections between the two entities are well documented. Upon
arrival in Chicago, most migrants generally knew State Street as the heart of the
established African American corridor on the South Side. Word spread through friends or
relatives living in Chicago and new migrants sought them out. A “Black Metropolis,”
rivaled only by Harlem, appeared in Chicago.
The first settler of the land was Jean Baptiste Point du Sable, a black settler from
Quebec. Du Sable established a trading post at the point where the shores of the river
emptied into Lake Michigan. This trade made it a place of many peoples. In the early 18th
century, Europeans, Americans, and Native American all utilized the land for raising
cattle, growing corn, and trading beaver pelts. A fusion of cultures based on trade
emerged as American settlers and Indians interacted peaceful. Trade was important to
maintaining this cultural fusion. Prior to its founding as a city, Chicago was a space
shared by these different groups.8
Unfortunately, the brief Black Hawk War shattered the peaceful trading paradise
in 1832. As Native American tribes moved across the Mississippi River into western
Illinois to reclaim territory recently ceded to the United States, hostilities soon erupted.
This violent conflict over trading routes and territory was a colonial precursor to future
battles over Chicago’s space. The American victory in the war reflected their political
and military dominance in an area that they had not before. The conclusion to the war

7
8

Grossman, Land of Hope, 100.
Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, 26-29.
10

saw the acceleration of the United States’ effort to move Native Americans to land west
of the Mississippi River.9
The defeat of the Native Americans allowed the federal government to
consolidate its control of their territory in present day Illinois and spurred settlement. By
1833, almost all territory around Chicago had been ceded to the United States
government through treaties with Native Americans. As more and more eastern settlers
arrived, Chicago’s population quickly increased. In 1833 the village population was less
than five hundred. Four years later, a village had become a city, with a population of over
four thousand.10
Settlers worked to take advantage of the area’s location on lake and river. Water
borne connections between East and South laid the groundwork for future development.
Inhabitants realized that a canal connecting the Great Lakes with the Mississippi River
would open new trading opportunities to the South, especially New Orleans. Land
speculators proposed a canal to connect the Chicago River with the Illinois River. Since
the Illinois River flows into the Mississippi, the canal would connect the Mississippi
River, the primary western north-south waterway with the Great Lakes, the main
transportation route of the northern U.S. Moreover, this canal would connect New
Orleans to New York, which would make Chicago the crux of this massive waterborne
transportation network. It could become one of the most important cities in the world.
Construction on the Illinois-Michigan Canal began in 1836 and twelve years later,

9

Ibid.
Pacyga, Chicago, 16-18.

10

11

Chicago became the center of a transportation network that connected most of the West
with the East.11
Complementing the river, canal, and lake triumvirate would be a network of
railroads that expanded the nation’s infrastructure. Railroads connected the city to the
wheat growing regions in northern Illinois and further points west. Chicago emerged as
the center of western agriculture. By 1850, all new rail lines in the west had their
terminus at Chicago. As more and more railroads converged on Chicago, the city’s
economic power and population grew. Railroad efficiency quickly made the old river and
canal transportation system all but obsolete. Lake Michigan however, remained vital.
Large shipping containers easily accessed Chicago’s harbor. Between the railroads and
lake, Chicago emerged as the gateway between east and west.
The railroads brought industry to the city. Small scale manufacturing industries
included foundries, shipbuilding, and breweries.12 Small shops produced agricultural
tools. Consistent demand from farmers for new tools made the agricultural implement
industry vital. In 1859, McCormick Reaper Works was the first large-scale factory in the
city, making grain reapers and employing hundreds of people.13 The brick industry was
crucial as well in a city with a rapidly expanding built environment. Prior to the Civil
War, Chicago had developed a diverse industrial economy that included chemicals, furs,
iron works, railroad cars and many others.14 These industries needed labor and people
from the New England and New York migrated to take advantage of these opportunities.
Soon European immigrants seeking a better life and opportunity followed them.
11

Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, 64-65.
Pacyga, Chicago, 40.
13
Ibid., 39.
14
Ibid., 40.
12

12

The influx of Yankees from New England, New York, and Pennsylvania in the
1850s was soon dwarfed by European immigration. Foreign-born migrants from Great
Britain, Ireland, and Scandinavia predominated. In 1850, half of Cook County was
foreign born.15 The Irish were the first sizeable immigrant community. From 1850 to
1870, the Irish foreign-born population exploded to 40,000. Native whites and European
ethnics contested Chicago’s space. Key to understanding the early narrative of Chicago
is, “the struggle, sometimes violent, of the first-comers and native whites against the later
immigrants.”16
Chicago’s foreign born population exploded after the Civil War. From 1860 to
1870 the foreign born population tripled from around 100,000 to almost 300,000.
Immigrants made up 80 per cent of Chicago’s population until World War I.17 They
worked on the railroads that sliced through the South Side; they worked in the steel mills,
the packing houses, and the factories that made agricultural machines.18 Throughout the
city, immigrants worked in unpleasant and laborious conditions. Their work was dirty,
dangerous, and difficult. Their hard labor was crucial to Chicago’s industrial growth.
Central to Chicago’s emergence as an industrial powerhouse was the opening of
the Union Stockyards on the South Side of the city in 1865. Located three and a half
miles from both Lake Michigan and the western city limits, and four miles from the
central city, the Stockyards occupied around 320 acres of South Side land west of Halsted

15

Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, 104.
Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, 17.
17
Pacyga, Chicago, 71.
18
Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, 17-18.
16

13

Street.19 Situated between the livestock rich plains of the Midwest and the urban centers
of the east, the stockyards grew rapidly, reinforcing Chicago’s place in the nation’s
transportation network. By 1900, nearly 14 million head of stock passed through on their
way to the slaughter. The stockyards grew geographically as well. In 1865, the stockyards
occupied 320 acres but by 1900 had enlarged to 475 acres, a massive facility. At the turn
of the century, 32,000 people worked in the stockyards and 47 percent of the city’s
population lived in the surrounding neighborhoods.20
Immigrants from Eastern and Southern European quickly filled slaughterhouse
jobs. They found housing in the Bridgeport, Back of the Yards, and Canaryville
neighborhoods. Plenty of housing allowed second and third generation families to remain
in the area, solidifying an ethnic culture. As African Americans arrived during World
War I however, the limited vacancies in these working class neighborhoods restricted
them to an area of neighborhoods called the “Black Belt” on the near South Side. African
Americans of all classes lived together. This prevented upward mobility. Consequently,
the African American middle class was more willing to pay higher prices for the same
housing. They wanted out of the slums. Landlords took the great African American
demand and made a profit. In order to pay for the housing families “doubled up,”
overcrowding the units similar to white ethnics. Since poor and middle class African
Americans lived together in the Black Belt at the turn of the century, whites perceived
their arrival as an imminent transformation of the neighborhood into a slum.21

19

Glen E. Holt and Dominic A. Pacyga, Chicago: A Historical Guide to the
Neighborhoods The Loop and the South Side (Chicago: Chicago Historical Society,
1979), 29-30.
20
Ibid; Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, 212.
21
Holt and Pacyga, Chicago: A Historical Guide to the Neighborhoods, 11.
14

The city’s spatial orientation reflected the sudden and constant strain of rapid
population growth. Real estate speculation, industrial expansion, neighborhood
development, industrial plants, and railway lines that popped up with no discernable
pattern allowed the city to develop haphazardly.22 The city had little power and less
interest in changing these patterns. Even if planners could regulate the city, they deferred,
fearing claims of manipulation. Chicago had no visionary plan for development and
growth.
Consequently, two basic patterns emerged that characterized Chicago. First, as
people grew wealthier, they fled the center of the city and moved to the urban periphery.
Poor workers lived and worked amongst the factories. Second, the immigrant
communities joined the outward stream as soon as they assimilated into American
society.23 This pattern of social and spatial mobility resulted in zones of growth. Chicago
followed an expanding concentric zone pattern with a central city, working class
neighborhoods, residential neighborhoods, and a small suburban commuter zone
inhabited by the wealthy in the late 19th century. This trend would be the rule after the
city rebuilt after the Fire of 1871.
Chicago, a city of wooden buildings, was easily susceptible to fire. When the Fire
of 1871 started, whole acres burned to the ground. Much of the northeastern district of
the city burned. This “burnt district” included twenty-eight miles of streets and three and

22

Charles Merriam, Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1929), 73.
23
Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, 13.
15

a half square miles. 17,000 buildings were destroyed and a third of the city was
homeless.24 The government was completely unable to respond to the destruction.
The aftermath of the Chicago fire led to a period of reinvestment in the city and a
newfound commitment to urban regulation. Like a phoenix resurrected from its own
ashes, Chicago would rise again.25 While Chicago rebuilt itself quickly, the progress was
undermined by decades of urban chaos that continued to reshape the city’s spatial
development.
Despite regulation, urban chaos and near constant economic disruption changed
the nature of the relationship between Chicago’s government and the people. People
looked to the government to alleviate social and economic problems caused by the fire.
After the debris and rubble from the fire was dumped into the lake, the city council
authorized new public works projects for the burnt land. The city government created a
department of inspection and the government took a proactive approach towards
preventing further fires by outlawing the construction of wooden buildings.26
Unfortunately these tactics were unpopular with the working classes, since they could not
afford to build their homes with more expensive bricks. The poor saw this as undeserved
retribution for causing the fire.27
Chicago’s regeneration was further disrupted by the economic depression in 1873.
The economic slow down hurt the working classes the most. As laborers moved into the
city to assist in the fire cleanup, lower wages, higher rents, and class divisions appeared.

24

Pacyga, Chicago, 77.
Lisa Krissoff Boehm, Popular Culture and the Enduring Myth of Chicago, 1871-1968
(New York: Routledge, 2004), 23-24.
26
Pacyga, Chicago, 82.
27
Ibid., 82.
25
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Tensions were high. Chicago’s elite feared a revolution similar to the recent Paris
Commune.
Slowly but surely a combination of midwestern labor and eastern capital worked
to rebuild the city. The result was a more modern urban environment. Business and
government were centralized. The Loop, Chicago’s central business district, emerged.
Industry and residential use were scattered across the city. Chicago’s fire leveled the city,
but provided an opportunity to reshape patterns of growth and development.28 As the
decades of urban chaos gave way to unrestricted foreign-born migration into the city,
Chicago would face a new element to spatial development.
By 1890, the city had recovered and emerged as the center of meatpacking,
steelworks, railroads, retail, and many other industries. New immigrants poured into the
city. These Eastern and Southern European immigrants arrived in large numbers. From
1880-1890, the foreign born population increased by 245,000 and the total population
doubled within ten years, propelling Chicago’s rise to second largest city in the nation by
the turn of the century.29 Nearly 78 per cent of its population was either foreign born or
had foreign-born parents.30 Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Italians, Hungarians, Lithuanians, and
Jews from Russia all passed into the city. Struggling to find their way in a confusing
American culture and urban environment, these immigrants sought out a recreation of
familiar community that would help assimilate newcomers while maintaining a sense of
culture and identity.31

28

Ibid., 100.
Thomas Lee Philpott, The Slum and the Ghetto Neighborhood Destruction and MiddleClass Reform, Chicago 1880-1930, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 7-8.
30
Spear, Black Chicago, 4.
31
Ibid.
29
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Chicago’s urban space began to be divided by ethnicity. The North Side had large
populations of Germans, Poles, and Scandinavians. The West Side consisted of a
scattering of Czechs, Poles, and Italians. On the South Side, the Irish, Polish, and
Lithuanian communities bordered the narrow African American Black Belt. Substantial
Polish immigration at the turn of the century turned the Northwest side neighborhood
bordered by Chicago Avenue, Clybourn Avenue, and Carpenter Street into Polonia.32 The
Polish Triangle, at the intersection of Milwaukee, Ashland, and Division on the near
Northwest Side became the cultural center of the community.33 The area surrounding the
intersection of Clark Street and Lincoln Avenue contained the highest density of
Germans. A small Swedish colony formed around the junction of North Ashland and
Foster Avenues in the North Side. Pilsen, a neighborhood south of 16th Street between
Halsted and Ashland, had the largest number of Czechs with a scattering of Poles as
well.34
The South Side was a diverse mixture of many different ethnic groups who
worked in the steel mills and packinghouses.35 The Irish maintained their dominance in
Canaryville and Bridgeport just east of the Stockyards between 43rd and 47th Streets.
Another patch of Polish neighborhoods emerged in Brighton on the western edge of the
Stockyards between Western and Pulaski Avenues. Irish and Poles on either side
surrounded a solid block of Lithuanians living in Bridgeport.36 Although many of these
neighborhoods were poor, it was possible for these immigrants that found jobs to find
32

Robert A. Holland, Chicago in Maps 1612 to 2002, (New York: Rizzoli, 2005), 173.
Dominic Pacyga, Polish Immigrants and Industrial Chicago: Workers on the South
Side 1880-1922, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1991), 41-42.
34
Pacyga, Chicago, 186.
35
Ibid.
36
Holland, Chicago In Maps, 174.
33
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better housing outside of the central city. This pattern of social mobility emerged at least
by the second generation of immigrants. The distinct exception to this was African
Americans who did not have the same opportunity. No matter how prosperous they
became, opportunity to relocate was denied.37
These ethnic environs provided a source of character, created unity, and inspired
loyalty. The creation of these ethnic spaces reinforced cultural solidarity. Constant
population growth made the intrusion of different ethnicities inevitable, creating conflict.
Religious, ethnic, regional and language divisions all made the establishment of a unique
homogenous ethnic neighborhood difficult. The contestation over space in creating these
neighborhoods increased the immigrants’ sense of community and loyalty. When
newcomers encroached on their space, sometimes violent conflict would erupt.
Across the city, many neighborhood boundaries reflected those established by
Catholic parishes. Often street gangs patrolled the spaces. As the ethnicity of
neighborhoods solidified, immigrants fought to defend their neighborhood space from
intrusion. Streets separated ethnic enclaves and crossing into these areas if you did not
belong could be dangerous. Students maintained a strict loyalty to the neighborhood
based on parochial school attendance. In these schools, native languages were taught,
further reinforcing the ethnic identity of the immigrants.38 As the decades passed,
however, the city expanded, people’s class status changed and many of the old
neighborhoods’ residents died or moved away. The neighborhoods broke up.
In the decades after World War I, Chicago’s neighborhoods began to take on
more importance as a result of public transportation. The construction of suburban trains
37
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allowed the wealthy to move to the outskirts of the city. These new developments also
allowed lower and middle class workers to leave the center city and create new
neighborhoods. Milwaukee Avenue provided a primary means of egress. The street,
which extends diagonally from the city center to the northwest, gave Germans, Swedes,
Poles and Jews an avenue out of the center city. New neighborhoods straddled this
corridor. St Boniface Catholic Church on Noble and Chestnut Streets became the heart of
the German community.39 Polish Catholics arrived in large numbers as well and while
some Germans welcomed their fellow Catholics, disputes over the parish language often
erupted. Poles soon built their own two Catholic Churches down the block from St.
Boniface.
World War I provoked economic expansion, which sparked a new wave of
internal migration that would fundamentally change the city. Mass European immigration
to Chicago and the United States ended because of the war. Factory owners no longer had
a steady stream of low skilled immigrant workers from Europe. Demand for military
arms from European nations increased. Factory owners needed more workers. They
turned to African Americans from the South to meet this demand for labor. Labor agents
roamed the southern states advertising job opportunities in Chicago’s factories. This
industrial expansion during the wartime economy created opportunity for blacks to move
north that might not have occurred.40 When African Americans arrived however, they
faced discrimination and segregation unmatched by earlier European immigration. Efforts
to create a neighborhood space by African Americans were contested.

39
40

Pacyga, Chicago, 74.
Grossman, Land of Hope, 13-14.
20

It was not only the demand for labor that encouraged black migrants to move to
Chicago. Higher wages, less oppressive race relations, and the allure of the urban
environment helped. But there was also the promise of “the North.” Indispensable in
describing Chicago was the African American newspaper, the Chicago Defender. Black
southerners turned to the paper before ever leaving the South. The circulation of the
Defender was extensive. African Americans from Louisiana to Georgia read about
Chicago. Glowing images of Chicago’s industrial might and its promise as a land of
freedom led many to dream of moving there.41 Oppressive race relations were another
major “push” factor. The Chicago Defender railed against the racist white supremacy of
the South while the threat of lynching was more than enough for blacks to consider
moving northward.
Most African Americans moved to an area of the South Side along State Street
called the Black Belt. During World War I, the Black Belt stretched from 22nd to 31st
Street. Seven miles long and only one and a half miles wide, the Black Belt was forced
into this narrow strip by the Irish neighborhoods on either side.42 This population density
was a result of the first Great Migration in World War I. When a few African Americans
moved out of the Black Belt to isolated homes in all white neighborhoods, other African
Americans quickly replaced them. As long as the number of African Americans remained
small, there was no cause for concern. Conditions changed when over 65,000 African
Americans arrived in Chicago between 1915 and 1920.43 African Americans were forced
to find housing in the adjoining white neighborhoods. The arrival of that many African
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Americans caused more affluent whites to leave, while the working class, who could not
afford to flee, defended their neighborhoods from a perceived invasion.
White residents in areas with isolated African American residents resorted to
violence and containment to keep their community homogenous. They organized
property owner’s associations to keep out African Americans. They exaggerated the
threat of African American “invasion.” Bombings were frequent. Between 1917 and
1921, fifty-eight homes were bombed, an average of one every twenty days.44 The worst
of these violent episodes occurred in 1919.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Black Population Chicago, 1910.45
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Figure 2. Distribution of Black Population Chicago, 1920.46
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Figure 3. Chicago's Black Belt.47
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The summer of 1919 was exceptionally hot. People needed a way to cool down.
Lots of Chicagoans patronized a local beach on Lake Michigan. On July 27, with a
temperature in the nineties, five male black teenagers decided to escape the insufferable
heat by going to the beach. As the boys swam in the lake, a lone white man started
throwing rocks at them. A rock struck one of the boys, knocking him out. He drowned
after his friends and a lifeguard failed to get him back to the beach in time. The police
were called, but they were already in the area dealing with another disruption at the white
beach, a few blocks away. A black police officer tried to arrest the white man but his
white superior overruled. Soon a crowd of angry African Americans had formed on the
beach demanding justice. The white policemen, undeterred by the angry mob, arrested an
African American man, further infuriating the crowd. As the arrested black man was
escorted into a police wagon, someone fired a gun into the police officers. The policemen
returned fire, fatally injuring an African American man. The gunfire signaled the start of
Chicago’s worst race riot.48
Following the confrontation at the beach, white and black mobs roamed their
respective neighborhoods beating, stabbing, and shooting anyone of the opposite race.
The violence spread across the city into the North and West Sides and the Loop.
Chicago’s undermanned police force was ill equipped to handle the situation. Cooling
rains and the arrival of several regiments of the state militia finally halted the worst of the
violence. When the riots ended, seven black men had been murdered by police officers
and mobs had killed sixteen African Americans and fifteen whites. Over 500 Chicagoans
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were injured.49 The race riots of 1919 represent the violent culmination of a long period
of white resentment and anger at the expanding presence of African Americans in
Chicago. The relatively peaceful 1920s were characterized by simmering racial tensions,
which would continue to manifest itself until the end of the decade. By 1925, the
bombings had mostly ended and the restrictive covenant, an agreement between
homeowners not to sell to African Americans, was the popular form of racial
containment.
The stock market collapse of 1929 and the Great Depression hurt Chicago
particularly hard because of the city’s reliance on manufacturing and industry. The city’s
unemployment rate was high. Sixty percent of the unemployed in the state of Illinois
lived in Chicago. By 1931, Chicago’s thirty percent unemployment rate was higher than
the national average.50 The downturn hurt the African American community hardest. 50
percent of African Americans had no job.51 People relied on assistance from traditional
sources like churches, homeless shelters, and state relief agencies. Both public and
private organizations struggled to meet the needs of the unemployed.52 Chicago faced
unprecedented economic crisis during the Great Depression and this led to political
change that would last for the rest of the century.
Depression era Chicago was transformed by stark poverty and unemployment.
People looked to the government for assistance and elected a new Democratic regime that
would rule the city for decades. Ethnic groups became increasingly assimilated into
American society. Their neighborhoods lost ethnic character as residents left. The
49
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African American population was growing in the Black Belt. It was visible and hard to
ignore. The outbreak of war in Europe would again instigate greater social, economic,
and racial change. Competition and contestation of Chicago’s space entered a new and
confusing era.
World War II impacted Chicago on social, economic, and demographic levels.
The city played a prominent role in the wartime economy and industrial production. After
the German invasion of Poland in the fall of 1939, Chicago’s Polish community
mobilized to protest and demonstrations were held. Eastern European Jews actively
encouraged American intervention in the war on behalf of their oppressed brethren in
Germany. Similar to World War I, Chicago’s ethnic groups were actively engaged in the
events in Europe, unlike the disengaged American population.53 These groups tried to
influence American opinions toward intervention in the war. It was obvious to Mayor
Edward Kelly that America was going to be involved and he worked to make Chicago a
city that would be central to the home front, even before the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor. Organizing industries and businesses to prepare for wartime was a major part of
his plan.54
With its diverse industrial economy, Chicago’s companies produced all kinds of
military goods and services. Field rations, parachutes, and airplanes were manufactured.
Chicago was the second most productive city in the nation. High levels of production
reinvigorated the economy. This created a labor shortage that would be filled by women
and African Americans. Black workers comprised almost fourteen percent of the labor
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force of Cook and Dupage Counties.55 Unfortunately they still faced residential
segregation and labor discrimination. Because of all the workers coming to Chicago, the
city faced a housing crisis. After the war, the housing shortage was compounded by the
return of war veterans and their expanding families. Crucial to remedying this crisis
would be clearing the slums, allowing low income residents, especially African
Americans, to get decent housing.56
After migration decreased during the Great Depression, World War II saw a
resumption of African American mass migration to Chicago. This second Great
Migration saw the largest increases to Chicago’s black population in history. In fact,
Chicago became the epicenter of the greatest demographic shift in American history.
During World War II over 60,000 African Americans arrived to work in factories
producing airplanes, munitions, and parachutes. In the 1940s, the black population grew
from 278,000 to 492,000.57 In the twenty years after the war, migration continued
unabated. The black population of Chicago increased to over 800,000.58 The massive
influx of African Americans began a new and troubling chapter in the story of Chicago’s
neighborhood development and spatial contestation. The rapidly increasing African
American presence, “put Chicago in the same position of having to respond to the issue
of race in a comprehensive way that would affect the whole fabric of life there.”59 The
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enormity of the African American presence was the tipping point, upsetting Chicago’s
fragile racial dynamic, which had defined so much of the city’s vibrant history.
From the Great Depression until the end of World War II, the only available
housing for African Americans was in the Black Belt. Still only a few blocks wide, the
Black Belt stretched southward for thirty blocks.60 Geographically confined, new
migrants amplified the density of the Black Belt and accelerated the deterioration of the
housing stock. The situation was compounded by Chicago’s wartime housing crisis. The
influx of workers and no housing construction made conditions treacherous.61 African
Americans lived in deteriorating apartments and tenements. Many kitchenettes
apartments were divided in half to accommodate more tenants, had no plumbing,
electricity, or even adequate sanitation. Unable to expand and under constant pressure
from newcomers, the black belt got only worse which made white residents even more
determined to prevent the Black Belt’s expansion. The government seemed to be the only
entity able to remedy the situation.
Established in 1937, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) was the only city
agency that could fix the housing crisis and the Black Belt conditions. Designed by
Mayor Edward Kelly to clear the city’s slums and build affordable public housing
projects, the CHA was a progressive institution that championed the housing rights of
African Americans. As African American demand for CHA projects rose, integration
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with white neighborhoods was particularly difficult. By the 1952, nearly 6,000 African
American families lived in public housing.62
The United States Housing Authority was an agency created under the New Deal.
Increased funding for the USHA made possible the construction of four projects across
the city. In 1938, the Jane Addams Homes were built on the West Side, Lathrop Homes
on the North Side, and Trumbull Park on the South Side. These projects were all white,
while a fourth and largest, the Ida B. Wells Homes was constructed in a predominantly
African American neighborhood. The racial segregation complied with federal housing
policy, which mandated projects maintain the same racial composition as the surrounding
neighborhoods. During and after World War II, the CHA built housing projects for
workers and returning veterans. Attempts at integration of these projects failed. In 1949,
after federal legislation provided funding for public housing, the CHA proposed new sites
for public housing scattered across the city that were rejected by the city council. From
then on, CHA policy became to build projects only in African American neighborhoods.
The 1950s and 1960s saw the CHA build high-rise projects, especially concentrated
along a four-mile corridor of State Street, the heart of the Black Belt.63 These projects
combined with the Dan Ryan Expressway to form a figurative “wall” dividing the
African Americans neighborhoods and white neighborhoods.
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Figure 4. Stateway Gardens at Dawn, 1981. The beginning of Chicago’s “wall” stretching southward toward the
Robert Taylor Homes.64

The second mass migration of African Americans to Chicago from the South
between 1940 and the late 1960s was a process that completely changed the social,
demographic, and spatial patterns of the city. Spatial contestation and competition took a
much more sinister turn. By World War II, the Black Belt had enlarged to occupy
neighborhoods from the Loop to 55th Street. As more African American workers arrived
daily to fill jobs in the factories, overcrowding in black neighborhoods became a huge
problem. The expanding community continued to encroach on the white ethnic
neighborhoods. When the number of African Americans became too large, whites
responded in violent and discriminatory ways. The white reaction to the influx of African
Americans would define the postwar era.

64

Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 244.
32

Especially on the South Side, white ethnics felt threatened by the emergence of a
new minority group. They reacted by creating legal methods to keep African Americans
out of their neighborhoods. Through neighborhood covenants, legal discrimination, and
violence, whites resisted the African American presence. Whites feared the invasion of
their neighborhoods by African Americans. At the same time, African Americans felt a
strong ethnic connection with fellow Black Belt residents. Cultural and institutional
development created a space more attractive for blacks looking to avoid white prejudice.
This combination of exclusion from white neighborhoods and ethnocentrism propelled
migrants into the ghetto.65
The end of World War II was the beginning of a new era in Chicago’s history.
Prolonged African American migration combined with political maneuvering to
segregate them in public housing, became a disturbing pattern. In 1965, more African
Americans lived in Chicago than in Mississippi. Chicago public housing alone had a
higher population than Selma, Alabama.66 Chicago’s long and storied history entered an
ominous new era that would define the city for decades. The Chicago Housing Authority
would play a pivotal role in shaping housing policy and integration. The steady increase
in African Americans forced city leaders to make significant decisions about housing and
integration, which would have a lasting impact on the future of African Americans in
Chicago.
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CHAPTER TWO
POLITICAL HIJACKING:
THE 1949-1950 SITE SELECTION CONTROVERSY
Located in the heart of Chicago’s Black Belt on a narrow strip of land between
State Street and the Dan Ryan Expressway stood the Robert Taylor Homes, the largest
public housing project in the world. Named after the Chicago Housing Authority’s first
African American chairman, the Robert Taylor Homes consisted of twenty-eight identical
sixteen-story buildings and contained 4,415 units. They were home to 27,000 residents.1
Nearly all of the residents were poor and African American. Stateway Gardens, another
high-rise public housing project just north of the Robert Taylor Homes, extended this
ominous stretch of public housing for over two miles.2 Their location in Chicago’s Black
Belt was not an accident but a result of a series of decisions made by city leaders and
financed by taxpayer dollars. The conflict between those who wanted to breakdown the
walls of the ghetto through scattered site public housing and racist city leaders who
wanted to confine the African American to the ghetto resulted in these high-rise projects,
which effectively isolated thousands of African Americans. The towers of the projects
combined with the Dan Ryan expressway concentrated, segregated, and isolated African
Americans within Chicago.
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Figure 5. Robert Taylor Homes.3

3

Bowly Jr., The Poorhouse, 125.
35

The location of these sites in predominantly African American neighborhoods
was the result of a protracted battle over site selection between the Chicago Housing
Authority and the city council in 1949-1950. Passage of the 1949 Federal Housing Act
provided cash grants to municipalities for public housing construction. President Harry
Truman’s Housing Act intended to provide affordable housing for every American by
increasing the role of the federal government. This started a scramble among
municipalities across the country to obtain funding to build new public housing projects.
Able to acquire federal funding for 21,000 units, the CHA submitted a list of
potential sites to the city council for approval in August 1949. The CHA’s proposal
contained a number of sites for public housing to be built on vacant land in outlying areas
of the city in mostly white neighborhoods. This would be a way to break up the
deteriorating housing conditions in the Black Belt and force some means of residential
integration. Instead the CHA was forced to accept a program of sites that were confined
directly to African American neighborhoods. This would ensure that African Americans
would remain isolated and segregated from the rest of Chicago. From 1950 onwards,
CHA housing policy would be to build large housing projects in predominantly African
American neighborhoods.
The location of the Robert Taylor Homes, Stateway Gardens and many other
public housing projects on the South Side would have significant social and economic
consequences for African Americans. The high-rise towers concentrated low income
African Americans and prevented them from obtaining jobs in a decentralizing
postindustrial economy. The high density of low-income people strained public services
and schools. Structurally, the high-rise projects housed large numbers of people on small
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plots of land, but lacked the comfortable feeling of a home. Ironically, high-rise public
housing projects were built during a time when most new residential construction was the
single-family home in the suburbs. By their demolishment in 2000, the Robert Taylor
Homes had become a symbol for the failure of public housing in the United States.
Finding the reasons for this failure lies in the decisions made by the Chicago Housing
Authority and city council in 1949.
After World War II Chicago faced a housing crisis. The Great Depression, the
influx of African Americans from the South, widespread poverty, and a lack of housing
construction resulted in a severe housing shortage. In the middle of the 1930s, one third
of Chicago’s families had incomes of less than $1,000 a year. The income of many
Chicago families put them in a position where they could not afford decent housing.
Because of the economic downturn, housing construction failed to keep up with
population increases. 7,619 homes were built in Chicago between 1930 and 1938 and it
was estimated that 150,000 housing units would be needed to eliminate the shortage.4
The lack of housing construction due to the Depression meant a housing shortage for
low-income families. This forced them to live in dilapidated and overcrowded tenements
and slums. The housing shortage was most acute in African American neighborhoods
where residents could not escape the slums to better neighborhoods because of white
restrictive covenants. Living in dense, overcrowded, kitchenette apartments, often with
multiple families sharing one bathroom, African Americans inhabited the worst housing
in the city.5
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Creation of the Chicago Housing Authority in 1937 met some skepticism from
conservatives. People were wary of the federal government providing housing for the
poor. It was unheard of for the government to provide housing for the poor. Before the
New Deal, many low-income residents lived in squalid tenements and slums. In response
to the skepticism, the CHA was presented as a vital city agency that would clear
Chicago’s slums, build public housing projects, and provide jobs for the unemployed.6
Before World War II, the CHA built Trumbull Park Homes and Julia Lathrop
Homes on vacant land in white areas on the far South Side and North Side of the city.7
These projects were far away from African American neighborhoods and the CHA
intended to keep them all white due to the neighborhood composition rule. This unwritten
rule stated no housing project could alter the racial composition of the surrounding
neighborhood through integration.8 The CHA followed this rule but began to admit
African Americans into all white projects gradually.
The CHA experimented with integration at the new Cabrini Green project on the
near North Side in 1942. The CHA sought a one to four ratio of African Americans to
whites in the new project. Plenty of African Americans applied, but a dearth of white
applicants made meeting the quota difficult. Whites viewed public housing as a step
down while African Americans were desperate to move out of the slums into new units.
African Americans pushed hard to gain priority in the projects while the Italian residents
of the surrounding neighborhood greatly resented the CHA’s integration policies. After a
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public relations campaign to attract whites, the CHA managed to gain enough suitable
whites to achieve their quota at Cabrini Green a year later.9 Integrating projects would
continue to be an issue for the CHA.
The CHA’s experience with integration before World War II was a precursor to
the challenges they would face in the postwar decades. Under the leadership of African
American chairman Robert Taylor and Executive Secretary Elizabeth Wood, the CHA
embarked on an effort to breakdown the walls of the African American ghetto through
integrated public housing built on vacant land across the city. Building sites on vacant
land would not displace African American families and provided an opportunity to,
“break down ancient prejudices.”10 Taylor, a Harvard educated architect, understood both
issues facing African Americans and the poor quality of housing in Chicago. Elizabeth
Wood was a passionate progressive who advocated for the housing rights of African
Americans. Both Wood and Taylor would lead the CHA during the battles with the city
council over site selection for public housing in the late 1940s.11
The Chicago housing shortage hurt African Americans the most. The Great
Migration drastically increased Chicago’s African American population and housing
construction failed to keep up in proportion to the increase. As a result, many lived in
overcrowded and crumbling tenements. White residents blocked racial transition and
integration into neighborhoods. In order to remedy the situation, Taylor pursued a policy
of building projects in areas of limited white resistance in order to expand black housing
opportunity.
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In the CHA’s ten projects, African Americans occupied 60 percent of the units.12
White residents perceived the organization as serving only African Americans. This
perception shaped the battle between the CHA and city council over site selection in
1949. In fact, the CHA took a middle course. The CHA saw no advantage in reinforcing
the scattered projects of the blighted neighborhoods because that would only reinforce
segregation. At the same time, the CHA did not want to fully integrate their projects
because of white backlash.
The end of World War II saw the CHA change their racial policy more out of
circumstance than a desire to integrate their projects. Returning war veterans to Chicago
needed housing and the CHA was forced to set aside the neighborhood composition rule.
The CHA built twenty-one temporary veterans projects in eleven different wards. Most of
this housing was built on vacant land in outlying white neighborhoods. In order to reduce
potential violence from white residents opposed to African Americans living in their
neighborhoods, the CHA encouraged African American veterans to live in larger projects
like the Airport Homes and Fernwood Homes in order to dilute their presence.13 The
number of African Americans was kept small. They only made up 10 percent of the
projects. Even still, the presence of African Americans in white neighborhoods instigated
violent backlash.
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Figure 6. Location of housing disturbances.14
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Unfortunately, the presence of African American veterans caused violence and
rioting at both Airport Homes and Fernwood. The Airport Homes rioting was the worst
racial violence Chicago had seen in thirty years. The arrival of two African American
families in 1946 sparked immediate hostile reactions from white residents. 200 people
threw stones, shouted profanity, and threatened the families.15 400 policemen were
required to maintain the peace for nearly a month. Finally, the African American families
succumbed to the pressure and moved out. Airport Homes remained all white.
Violence erupted again at the Fernwood Homes in August 1947. When eight
African American families moved into the projects, a mob of 5,000 angry white residents
greeted them. Over the next three nights, sporadic acts of violence occurred and one
thousand policemen were required to keep some semblance of order.16 Six months later,
the worst violence had finally subsided and the police presence was reduced. The African
American families could finally feel safe living in Fernwood.
The significance of these two riots lies more in the change in occupant of the
mayor’s office than in the white violence towards African Americans. Between the
Airport Homes riot and the Fernwood riot, Democratic Mayor Edward Kelly, a longtime
supporter and protector of the CHA, resigned. His successor, Martin H. Kennelly, a
wealthy businessman handpicked by the Democratic machine, had no sympathy for the
CHA. Kennelly issued no public statement condemning the riots at Fernwood and instead
tried to force the CHA to pursue another integration policy.17 The Airport Homes and
Fernwood Riots were a response to the CHA’s abandonment of the neighborhood
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composition rule. The election of Martin Kennelly meant the CHA no longer had support
from the mayor’s office. The CHA lost a political ally in Mayor Kelly and
simultaneously realized the implications of white resistance and racism.18 While ethnic
whites used violence to defend their neighborhoods, Chicago’s business owners
marshaled their considerable resources to fight back against neighborhood change.
The Illinois legislature passed the Illinois Blighted Areas Redevelopment and
Relocations Act of 1947 as a way to stimulate private development in slum cleared areas.
The state would provide funding to clear slum land, which would then be sold to private
companies who would then redevelop the land. In addition to providing funding for urban
redevelopment, the Relocations Act gave the city council control and veto power over the
CHA in site location for public housing because it wanted to decide the location for new
public housing.19 The CHA’s ambitious agenda to breakdown the ghetto through public
housing projects in white neighborhoods scared the council. Now with passage of the
Relocations Act, the CHA was beholden to the city council. Locations for new projects
now had to be approved by the council.
Innovative and groundbreaking, the Relocations Act brought business into the
process of fighting neighborhood change. By combining public funds with private
enterprise, investment, and development, the legislation was the first of its kind in the
country and allowed greater business influence in urban renewal.20 The Act would allow
public funds to buy and clear land, which could then be sold for private development. It
created the Chicago Land Clearance Commission (CLCC), which now became
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responsible for slum clearance and redevelopment instead of the CHA.21 After making
improvements on the land, the CLCC would then sell the land to private developers. The
flip side of this process was clearing the land would involve displacement of former
residents, mostly African American. These residents would either have to find housing in
the private market or turn to the CHA.
The first project developed after passage of the Relocations Act was the Lake
Meadows site on the near South Side. New York Life Insurance was contracted to build
new housing and redevelop the site. Costing twenty two million dollars, the Lake
Meadows project was a significant investment in housing and redevelopment. Clearing
the land cost taxpayers eleven million dollars. New York Life only had to pay two
million. New York Life built two twenty-three-story apartment buildings with 1,500
dwelling units.22 African Americans protested the Lake Meadows project. Before the
project could begin, the families living in the blighted areas had to be relocated. Only
twenty five percent of the residents could afford the rent in the new apartments. The
remainder were housed by the CHA or had to find housing in the private market. In order
to accommodate the Lake Meadows project, 3,600 African American families were
relocated.23
The displacement of African American residents by private development created
new demand for public housing.24 Fear of finding new housing in a city that did not seem
to want them prompted many African Americans to turn to the CHA. Top priority was
21
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given to attracting private development, not the relocation of residents.25 The forced
relocation of African American residents showed the lack of empathy of big business and
city leaders to people losing their homes. African Americans were largely shut out of the
decision making process. This process of slum clearance, redevelopment, and
displacement began in Chicago. This formula would be replicated in other cities across
the country.
By decentralizing public housing in the United States, the 1949 Federal Housing
Act gave control over site selection to localities.26 With the Relocations Act already in
place, the passage of federal housing legislation started a rush for local agencies to get
federal money to build public housing. The housing agencies would control where they
built the projects. Originally, the power over site selection would be given to the CHA
under the Federal Housing Act but the Illinois Relocations Act included a provision
giving the power of site selection to governing bodies of municipalities in Illinois over
500,000 people.27 Of course, Chicago was the only city in the state that size. For the first
time in its history, the CHA was beholden to the city council.
The massive 16 billion dollar national housing program would provide funding to
build 810,000 homes over six years.28 The CHA of course, wanted its share of the money
flowing from the federal government and submitted a proposal for funding in 1949.
Chicago was such a high need area that according to CHA estimates, 40,000 units would
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be appropriate based on the funding the state of Illinois was expected to receive.29 In June
of 1949, the City Council approved the CHA’s request for funding to build 40,000 units.
However, the CHA only received funding for 21,000 units at a cost of 210 million dollars
because the federal government had to evenly distribute the money across the entire
nation.30
The funding the CHA received would be the first for a major metropolitan area
and the second largest allocation in the nation. In order to receive the full funding, the
CHA needed to select sites for 12,000 housing units by August 1950 and 9,000 by
August 1951.31 The CHA presented a list of seven sites to Mayor Kennelly in October of
1949. Four sites for 5,000 units would be built on blighted land in African American
areas and three sites on vacant land in white neighborhoods for 5,000 units.32 The council
and mayor immediately met the CHA’s vacant land sites with skepticism. The ensuing
ten-month controversy from the time the CHA first submitted their package of sites to the
mayor in October of 1949 to the compromise with the city council in June 1950 was a
drawn out, disorganized, mess that left the CHA with little political power.
The Chicago city council would have to pass any CHA site selection package
under the new Illinois legislation. The city council was made up of fifty Aldermen who
were elected to four-year terms from wards of roughly 25,000 to 65,000 registered
voters.33 One third of the city council was Irish. The remaining were descendants of
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Southern and Eastern European immigrants. Two were African American.34 Once elected
to the city council, most Aldermen became more concerned with affairs in their
respective wards and wished to remain in office by appealing to the ward’s interests. If
time permitted, they would consider the interests of the city as a whole. Aldermen were
responsible for looking out for the special interests of their constituents and were
important members of the community. Public housing was an issue that would intimately
change neighborhoods. Alderman would be more likely to respond to their constituent
voices against low rent housing than to consider the city’s overwhelming need for public
housing.
The leadership of the council would have great influence in determining the
location for public housing projects. At the time of the site selection controversy, six
Aldermen called the “Big Boys” dominated the city council.35 These Aldermen were the
most powerful machine politicians in the city and worked closely with Mayor Kennelly
on interests pertaining to their wards. The two most powerful “Big Boys” on the council
were John J. Duffy and Clarence Wagner. Both represented wards on the South Side of
Chicago. Their predominantly white wards included vacant land that was targeted by the
CHA for public housing.36 Aldermen from the South Side feared the building of public
housing in their wards would bring African Americans and other “undesirable” people
into their neighborhoods. The Aldermen distrusted the CHA and remained skeptical of
public housing.
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Figure 7. Chicago Ward Map.37
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The city council detested the CHA because it was a “clean” organization. With
thousands of jobs, thousands of units of housing, and millions of dollars in contracts, the
CHA had the potential to be a powerful patronage tool.38 However, the CHA refused to
give patronage to the “Big Boys” or give them any leverage over the Authority.
Patronage was a powerful tool in Chicago politics and the purity of the CHA was a
reason the council prolonged the controversy over public housing sites.39 The city council
wanted some matter of revenge against the Authority for not providing patronage.
Stymieing their site selection package was a way to get back.
There was smaller African American representation in the city council than their
numbers in Chicago would indicate. By the end of the 1940s, nearly 500,000 African
Americans lived in the city.40 Four wards in the city had a population that was
predominantly African American. African American Aldermen, Archibald Carey Jr. (R)
and William Harvey (D) represented two of these wards. The explanation for the small
African American representation is that African Americans were concentrated in the
wards of the Black Belt on the South Side. African Americans were located in a small
number of wards instead of being distributed throughout the city.41 Consequently, their
power in the city council was diminished.
The Democratic Party machine had dominated Chicago politics since 1923.42
During the Great Depression, the Democratic machine was able to get votes in exchange
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for dispensing jobs, welfare, favors and the prospect of social mobility to immigrants.43
At a time when there was not much offered in the way of public services, the Democratic
Party was able to cultivate a loyal multi ethnic coalition. The machine forced Ed Kelly to
resign because of his views on racial integration and handpicked Martin Kennelly to run
for office in 1947. During the site selection battles, the Democratic machine was able to
corral wayward Aldermen who hesitated to vote for the compromise package of sites,
reminding them no Alderman could get elected without the support of the Democratic
machine. The people did not choose the politicians that ran for office. The machine did.
The resignation of Mayor Edward Kelly in 1947 signaled a change in relations
between the executive office and the CHA. Kelly had been mayor of Chicago for
fourteen years through the Great Depression. As mayor, Kelly controlled all patronage in
the city and was the undisputed boss of the Cook County Democratic Machine. Kelly
used his power to support the CHA and racial integration. He isolated the organization
from the city council. He was their sponsor and protector.44 Elizabeth Wood did not have
to provide patronage jobs to Kelly’s supporters and was able to have free rein over
whomever she chose to hire.45
The Democratic Party machine handpicked Martin H. Kennelly to run for mayor
and he was elected in 1947. His election jeopardized the relationship between the CHA
and the city council. Kennelly decided to let the hostile city council operate
independently, meaning that the powerful South Side Aldermen would be able to control
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legislation and committee appointments.46 Kennelly was invested in maintaining the
status quo and was reluctant to pressure racial boundaries. Kennelly and Robert Taylor
agreed on very little when it came to public housing.47 In addition to Kennelly’s election,
the passage of the Relocations Act in 1947, giving the council veto power over site
selection, presented a challenging environment for the CHA to present their list of public
housing sites.
Within the Chicago Democratic machine was the African American sub machine
coordinated by Congressman William Dawson. Representing most of Chicago’s Black
Belt district in the House of Representatives, Dawson was able to build a strong political
organization by dispensing favors to his supporters.48 In return for giving the Democratic
Party the votes of African Americans, Dawson was provided federal patronage.49 He was
also vice chairman of the Cook County Central Committee and of the Democratic
National Committee. Dawson was also the committeeman for Alderman William
Harvey’s ward.50 As committeeman, Dawson made all the important political decisions
for the party in the ward. This particular ward was located in the heart of the Black Belt
and allowed Dawson to expand his political empire over the entire African American
community. Dawson was the most important African American politician in Chicago and
would remain in Congress for a quarter century.
The passage of the Federal Housing Act and the CHA acquiring funds for 21,000
units at a cost of 210 million dollars in August 1949 for public housing was the beginning
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of the site selection controversy.51 After a few months of survey and research on possible
sites for the housing, the CHA believed that the best way to go about re housing residents
displaced by slum clearance and urban redevelopment was through vacant land public
housing. Residents displaced by slum clearance such as those from the Lake Meadows
Project, would need a place to live before the redevelopment could begin. Also, housing
could be built on vacant land faster and cheaper than on blighted land. This would
increase the housing supply faster. Clearing slums would just reduce the number of units
in the city and would not solve the housing shortage.52
The Authority presented their proposal for seven sites to Mayor Kennelly in
October 1949. Four sites on blighted land would contain 5,000 units while three sites on
vacant land would have 5,000 units costing 100 million dollars.53 After Robert Taylor
presented the plan to Kennelly, the mayor did not even bother to read the list.54 Kennelly
claimed he did not want to endorse the sites and commit himself. He did not even read
the newspaper articles on them. Kennelly maintained a hands off approach towards
public housing site location and could not be convinced to support either the City Council
or the CHA. Lacking Kennelly’s endorsement, the proposal proceeded to the City
Council Housing Committee in December 1949.55
In a meeting between the CHA administration that included Robert Taylor and
Elizabeth Wood, and the council housing committee, Taylor outlined the vacant land
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policy. He detailed the desire to build on vacant land but did not articulate why. He also
said the projects would result in well-integrated and complete neighborhoods but also
failed to describe what this meant. Finally, Taylor urged haste before the federal funding
ran out.56
After scrutinizing the list of sites, the housing committee decided they would need
more information from the CHA about the quality of the sites. Three South Side
Aldermen on the committee came out in strong opposition to the package. Most of the
criticism came from Reginald DuBois. DuBois had a long-standing bias against the CHA.
Two years earlier he had claimed the CHA was guilty of inefficiency and
mismanagement in an investigation of their operating procedures.57 Another Alderman
who opposed the list of sites was the African American Democrat William Harvey.58
Harvey was particularly resistant to tearing down structurally sound buildings in slum
neighborhoods.59 He feared the disintegration of strong African American communities.
The criticism coming from the council centered on the CHA for overlooking the areas of
greatest need for public housing and using vacant land that could be used for private
development. After scrutinizing the list of sites, the housing committee concluded that the
list included too many sites on vacant land in white neighborhoods and rejected the
proposal.60
In February of 1950, five days of public hearings were held on the list of sites. On
one side of the debate were the opponents of public housing. The most active opposition
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came from neighborhood organizations in white and predominantly Irish Catholic areas.
White Irish Catholics just one or two generations earlier had managed to escape the
ethnic ghettoes and dismayed at the perceived invasion of the slum into their nice
neighborhoods. This fear fueled their vocal opposition during the public hearings.61
These groups were mostly from the South Side and far Southwest Side of the city. The
Southwest Neighborhood Council, the Southtown Planning Association, and the
Taxpayers Association Committee organized homeowners to protest public housing.62
They argued that low rent housing would decrease the property value of their homes.
Changes in property value would change the character of the neighborhoods. White
homeowners wanted to maintain the status quo of their neighborhoods. In reality, African
Americans moving into white neighborhoods would actually increase property values
since they were willing to pay more for the same housing.63
African American activists, liberal city planners and the CHA supported public
housing but African American support was mixed. Low income African Americans could
not articulate their views while the middle and upper classes remained disinterested.
African American Republican Alderman Archibald Carey supported public housing but
also realized that whites would control it. As long as African Americans faced hostility
from moving into white neighborhoods, they would want to live closer to African
American cultural and social life. Other African American leaders, such as Reverend J.C.
Austin criticized the Lake Meadows Redevelopment Project for its displacement of
African American residents. The slogan, “Slum clearance is Negro clearance” appeared
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across the Black Belt. Austin believed that public housing would be the same. It would
displace more African Americans and allow whites to retake the centrally located land.64
The divergent opinions of African Americans on public housing and slum clearance show
a community that was divided and skeptical about the ability of public housing to
breakdown residential segregation.
After the public hearings in February, the housing committee presented the
original proposal of seven sites to the city council. Bitter opposition forced the council to
reject five of the seven sites. Two slum land sites were approved for only 2,665 units. If
all seven sites had passed, there would have been a total of 10,000 units.65 The housing
committee suggested two more slum land sites and seven on vacant land. After studying
the sites, the CHA resubmitted their original seven sites and two additional sites on
vacant land for a total of 12,000 units. 8,000 would be on vacant land and 4,000 on slumcleared land.66
After the hearings and CHA’s submission of a second package of sites, there was
still no agreement. Recognizing the stalemate, two of the most powerful Aldermen on the
city council, John J. Duffy and William Lancaster, decided to recalibrate the proposal.
They knew the politics of public housing and how difficult it would be to pass a proposal
with too many sites on vacant land. Duffy and Lancaster increased the number of sites on
slum-cleared land in the African American ghetto. The Duffy-Lancaster plan included
10,000 units on slum-cleared land and 2,000 units on vacant land.67 Eight of the sites
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were in the African American neighborhoods and seven were on small vacant land sites
on the Southwest side of the city.68 The plan would displace over 12,000 African
American families yet provide relocation housing for only 2,112. When the projects were
eventually built, the net addition to the housing supply was only 47 units.69 The DuffyLancaster plan was almost the complete opposite of the CHA plan and would allow more
public housing in African American areas.
The only way any package of sites could pass the city council would be to make
the list attractive to Aldermen. The Duffy-Lancaster plan largely kept African Americans
in their previous neighborhoods and prevented the white exaggerated fear of deteriorating
property values. This made their plan attractive to Aldermen. The great irony of the
Duffy-Lancaster plan was that it called for more slum clearance, which would push
African Americans into white areas since there was a shortage of relocation housing.
Obviously, this was something the Aldermen definitely did not want.70 Additionally,
Duffy and Lancaster overlooked the high cost of city services for high-density public
housing projects. The Duffy-Lancaster public housing plan would put new public housing
in neighborhoods that already had public housing and all of the sites were located in
black communities. Extensive demolition and displacement of residents was required.71
The plan was the beginning of a committed process by the city council to restrict the
location of public housing to African American communities.
Supporters of public housing were put in a difficult position with the DuffyLancaster plan. African American leaders, liberal planners, and the CHA opposed the
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package on the basis that it would solidify segregation and prevent African American
residents from leaving the ghetto.72 However, rejection of the plan could risk losing all
federal money for public housing in Chicago. They appealed to the Public Housing
Administration (PHA) for help.
Federal public housing officials were well aware of what was going on in Chicago
but their response failed to initiate any substantial change. The PHA required the city
council to change the plans to meet racial equity. More sites in white neighborhoods were
needed but no specification on how many units. Duffy and Lancaster then added on a site
in a white neighborhood. In reality, this neighborhood was in rapid racial transition but
was still white.73 This lone adjustment was good enough for the PHA. The CHA’s hope
for support from the federal government ended.
Finally, in June 1950, the CHA’s Board of Commissioners accepted the DuffyLancaster Plan. All but one commissioner voted to accept the plan. All in all, the DuffyLancaster Plan contained thirteen sites. Eight sites were in the inner city on slum cleared
land for 8,000 to 11,000 units. Of the five sites in outlying areas on vacant land, only
three projects were actually built and two were extensions of existing projects.74 Duffy
and Lancaster half-heartedly included vacant land sites in order to appease the CHA and
the federal government. The CHA’s original list asked for 4,000 units in the slums and
8,000 units on vacant land. The Duffy Lancaster Plan delivered 10,250 units in the slums
and 2,100 units on vacant land.75
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Figure 8. Chicago Housing Authority Initial Site Proposals and Council Site Proposals, 1949-1950.76
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Figure 9. Foreign Born and African American Areas of Chicago, 1949-1950.77
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In July, public hearings on the Duffy-Lancaster plan were held yet again and the
anti public housing forces were stronger than ever. Homeowners argued there was no
need for another project, despite the housing shortage in Chicago. They claimed there
would be school shortages with the influx of new children. Other opponents argued that
projects did not do enough to relieve congestion, density, and segregation. There was not
going to be enough public housing for all of the displaced families either.78 The White
Circle League, a race hate group, spread propaganda about public housing. They wanted
to confine African Americans to the ghetto and keep them out of white areas.79
The blatant racism in the location of the sites worried three Aldermen supporters
of public housing. In a report, Aldermen Becker, Carey, and Merriam argued that the
number of units on vacant land should be increased to 9,200. They urged the council to
reject the proposal saying, “It is clearer than ever, that the selection of any vacant site will
arouse the opposition of the surrounding community. Nevertheless, the problem of slum
clearance and providing decent housing for low income families is ours….the acceptance
of this program will constitute a blow at the principles and practices of public housing
and slum removal. It will permanently freeze a vicious pattern of segregation. Not even
the impelling need for housing justifies compromise with such basic principles.”80
Unfortunately these principled Aldermen were the only ones on the council who spoke
out against the plan.
After another vociferous round of public hearings, the Duffy-Lancaster plan went
to the city council for a vote in August. The outcome was hardly determined. Many
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wayward Democratic Aldermen had to be forcefully persuaded by Democratic leaders the
day of the vote.81 Ultimately, the Democrats had little to fear as the plan passed 35-12.
Interestingly, the machine allowed the South Side Democrats to vote against the plan
because of their tenuous position in their wards. The machine worked and the
controversial Duffy-Lancaster plan was passed.
The passage of the Duffy-Lancaster plan in August 1950 began a pattern of
building public housing in neighborhoods that already had public housing and were
located in African American neighborhoods. Building these projects would require
extensive demolition and displacement of residents. These residents would then go to the
CHA for relocation housing. This process of slum clearance and displacement was the
beginning of urban renewal in Chicago.82
After passage of the Duffy-Lancaster plan, the CHA lost two out of the four sites
planned for white neighborhoods. The Chicago Sanitary Board owned one of the tracts of
vacant land and refused to sell to the Authority after Republicans replaced Democrats on
the Board. The Chicago and Western Indiana Railroad prevented an extension of the
Trumbull Park project on the far South Side as well. The CHA even tried to redraw the
plans to satisfy the railroad. It is unclear whether race or other outside pressures
contributed to the removal of the two white sites.83 Ultimately, the CHA lost potentially
one thousand units of housing on white sites, while all the sites in African American
neighborhoods were eventually constructed.
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Robert Taylor and several other progressive leaders frustrated by their defeat left
the CHA in 1950. Taylor’s resignation was the culmination of years of frustration with
the city council to recognize and remedy the terrible housing situation for African
Americans. The Chicago Defender praised Taylor’s service writing:
With great intelligence and a vast knowledge of housing, Mr. Taylor has made a
magnificent contribution to our city and he has done it against great odds. Every
advancement in public housing has been fought step by step. Almost every new
project drew opposition from those who could not or would not see the true
picture of Chicago’s plight in housing.84
It was clear with Taylor’s resignation that plans for slum clearance and public housing
were not worked out by the CHA, but by selfish interests and racial divisions. Taylor
understood the problems of race and housing in Chicago and his resignation was the end
of his crusade to breakdown residential segregation through public housing. Following
Taylor’s departure, new and more conservative members gained positions at the CHA.85
Eventually, the CHA would be drained of its progressive housing leaders.
The conflict with the city council badly damaged the CHA’s relationship with the
city and this impacted their ability to obtain funding to build public housing. The CHA
administration was effectively cut off from decisions made by the council. In order to get
federal money for their plans, the CHA needed permission from the city council. In late
1950, when the CHA asked for funding for 10,000 units, the council ignored them. A
later proposal for 3,500 units was also ignored. Finally, the CHA developed a list of sites
they thought could pass the council and were approved. 2,000 units for three sites in the
Black Belt were passed.86
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The election of mayor Richard J. Daley in 1955 allowed the city council to
completely control public housing site selection. Daley appointed Alvin Rose to head the
Authority in 1956. Rose was able to refine the process of site selection between the CHA
and council.87 Whenever there were disagreements about a site, Rose immediately
shelved the plan. Additionally, Daley staffed the CHA with people who remained loyal to
him and were able to accelerate the process of site selection.88 Rose and Daley
streamlined the site selection process between the CHA and city council allowing more
public housing to be built in African American neighborhoods.
Through public housing site selection, Daley and the CHA were able to keep
African Americans away from whites.89 In 1955, two thirds of CHA tenants were African
American and non-whites made up 73 percent of applicants trying to live in the
projects.90 By 1959, this number had risen to 85 percent. As the city council made more
choices about the location of public housing, projects were almost exclusively built in the
African American ghetto. By 1968, of the 54 CHA projects, 91 percent were located in
predominantly African American neighborhoods.91
The decision to build massive projects like the Robert Taylor Homes in the ghetto
was a concerted effort by racist politicians and whites that outright refused to live near
African Americans. Well-intentioned advocates of public housing stood no chance in the
face of such determination and resistance. The combination of private and public interests
to effectively conceal, confine, and contain the African American community into a
87
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ghetto would have long-term impacts for Chicago and American society. The outcome of
the site selection battles between the CHA and the city council and the decision to build
public housing in African American neighborhoods was the beginning of state sponsored
segregation.
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CHAPTER THREE
TRUMBULL PARK:
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY
After decades of contestation over housing, employment, and neighborhood
space, Chicago’s racial equilibrium was upset once again. The prolonged migration of
African Americans from 1940 to 1960 had made Chicago the epicenter of racial tension
and conflict. African Americans, who had arrived in large numbers looking for work in
wartime industries, instead found a severe lack of affordable housing and terrible living
conditions. The only place they were welcome, the Black Belt, quickly deteriorated into
an overcrowded slum. Since the geographic boundaries of the Black Belt had not
expanded in relation to the growing population, African Americans were confined to
deteriorating housing with minimal opportunities for relief. African Americans found
themselves trapped.
The Chicago Housing Authority was the only agency able to help relieve the
housing crisis. Returning war veterans, expanding families, and combined with the
emigration, made the housing shortage worse. Initially organized to clear the slums and
build affordable public housing, the CHA eventually became a progressive institution
fighting for the housing rights of African Americans. This evolution not surprisingly
opened the CHA to criticism from whites determined to keep African Americans out of
their neighborhoods. Public housing was a controversial program in the United States
because of the expanded powers of the federal government and CHA efforts to integrate
these scrutinized projects met swift backlash. Their efforts to integrate public housing
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failed after astonishing white resistance during the disturbances in the Trumbull Park
neighborhood in 1953-1954.
During World War II, 65,000 African Americans migrated to Chicago looking for
work.1 From 1940 to 1950, Chicago’s black population grew by 77 percent, from 278,000
to 492,000.2 Around 2,200 African Americans arrived in Chicago every week.3 In the
next decade the black population had almost doubled again. By 1960, 812,637 African
Americans lived in Chicago and made up 30 percent of Chicago’s population.4 Yet
available housing had not increased. The overcrowding created terrible conditions;
poverty, crime, gambling, and prostitution plagued the South Side Black Belt. Yet it was
better than the conditions in the South.
Encompassing only six square miles, the Black Belt’s borders had not changed
significantly since the end of World War I, despite the rapid increase in population. In
1920, the district stretched from 31st Street to 60th Street and was bordered on the west by
State Street and the east by Cottage Grove Avenue. Between 1920 and 1930, the Black
Belt expanded to include a small section of neighborhoods east of Cottage Grove. By
1940, the Black Belt had only added one section between 60th, 63rd, South Parkway, and
Cottage Grove.5 Surrounded on the west by hostile Irish residents and the east by upper
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class whites, the only direction the Black Belt could expand was south. As more and
more migrants arrived, this was the general pattern of Black Belt expansion.

Figure 10. Expansion of the Black Belt.6
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Upon arrival in Chicago, migrants temporarily moved in with friends or relatives,
increasing the number of people per housing unit and leading to overuse. Consequently,
migrants lived in old and rundown housing. Crumbling tenements endangered residents.
Collapsing porches were common and many fell to their death.7 The surge of new
residents enabled landlords to divide apartments in half to accommodate more tenants
and double the rents. These kitchenette apartments often had no water, electricity, or
heating. In some cases, nine families had to use one bathroom.8 The Chicago Housing
Authority became responsible for alleviating these conditions.
The appalling housing conditions aggravated poverty and social disorder. The
black belt had the highest proportion of families on welfare in Chicago. Over 50 percent
of families relied on public assistance.9 Widespread poverty created other social problems
like prostitution and gambling. High density and overcrowding facilitated the spread of
diseases like tuberculosis, resulting in high sickness and death rates.10 Juvenile
delinquency and high rates of illegitimacy damaged families. No recreational facilities
and decaying infrastructure compounded the problems. Structurally, half of the Black
Belt was considered blighted by city planners.11 There was no garbage disposal, the
schools were overcrowded, the crime rate was high, and police enforcement was nonexistent.
The African American community’s living conditions affected their perception in
mainstream society. The media played a critical role in perpetuating images of poverty
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and disorder in African American neighborhoods. Newspaper images of African
Americans living in terrible housing conditions unfairly connected race and class with
housing.12 People assumed if you lived in the slums it was because of your character. In
reality African Americans aspired to be socially mobile. They wanted to escape the
slums. When African Americans moved into CHA projects in white neighborhoods,
however, whites resisted because they associated slum conditions and neighborhood
decline with African Americans. They believed integrating neighborhoods through public
housing would destroy their valuable space. The CHA therefore faced the difficult task of
integrating public housing projects in areas where whites feared and detested the thought.

Figure 11. Black Belt slum.13
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Incorporated in 1937 by Mayor Edward Kelly, the Chicago Housing Authority
worked to improve the housing circumstances for African Americans through slum
clearance and building affordable housing for displaced slum dwellers. At the conception
of the agency, slum clearance was the priority. However, before the slums could be
removed, the CHA needed to find housing for the displaced residents. Their solution was
to build integrated public housing on vacant land near the outskirts of the city in
predominantly white neighborhoods.
Under the leadership of executive secretary Elizabeth Wood, the CHA initiated
prewar slum clearance in 1937. Using state funds and with guidance from the Works
Progress Administration (WPA), the CHA demolished over 8,000 units primarily in the
Black Belt.14 Once clear, public housing projects were built on the sites. Essentially, the
CHA was clearing slums in black neighborhoods and displacing African American
residents who then looked to the CHA for public housing.15 The CHA was rather
effectively ensuring sustainability by constantly displacing residents who then needed
public housing.
Complicating the issue for the CHA was the wartime housing crisis and suburban
development. The return of war veterans created new demand for housing. Families
began to grow and needed more space. Over 1.1 million families needed housing yet
there were only 900,000 available units.16 In addition, the only housing construction
occurred in the suburbs. 20,000 housing units were built in the suburbs compared to only
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6,000 in the city.17 By clearing the slums, the CHA would lower the number of units in
the city at the precise moment these units were most needed. Realizing this, the CHA
built public housing to increase the number of units in the city. The CHA requested funds
for 40,000 units from the federal government. They received money to build 20,000.
Despite not receiving funds for half of the units they desired, Chicago still acquired more
money for public housing than any other city.18 The combination of suburban housing
construction and federal funding for public housing gradually relieved Chicago’s housing
crisis.
Since racial transition and integration of white neighborhoods was blocked for a
number of reasons, African Americans turned to the CHA for housing. The CHA was the
only organization able to address the slum conditions in the ghetto and provide decent
housing for African Americans. Consequently, whites viewed the organization as
favoring African Americans. Low rents made CHA projects attractive to poor African
Americans and 92 percent of residents living in CHA projects from 1937-1945 were
African American.19
The CHA was caught in a struggle between two views of integration; open
occupancy and planned quotas. Open occupancy, the idea that African Americans could
live anywhere regardless of race was popular among civil rights leaders. Open occupancy
would relieve restrictions to African American housing by allowing them to determine
their housing choices without concern for the prejudices and skin color of their
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neighbors.20 Open occupancy however would result in African Americans choosing
public housing and whites fleeing the developments because or their many housing
options. Planned quotas, while somewhat unsettling to civil rights leaders, would ensure a
certain percentage of the tenants of a project were African American or white. For
instance, if a white family left a CHA unit, the unit would remain vacant until another
white family was found. Quotas would be the only way to integrate the developments.
Instead of open occupancy, the CHA placed quotas on some of their projects. Federal
reports recommended 40 to 60 percent total black occupancy for a single project yet
discouraged quotas.21
African American embrace of public housing, combined with white resistance
made integration difficult. For African Americans, a move to public housing was a step
up from the decaying slums. CHA projects had more amenities, space, and better utilities.
Whites had more housing options and, for the most part, could afford better housing.
They viewed public housing as a step down in status. Attracting whites to public housing
was the challenge for the CHA. When projects became majority African American, it was
almost impossible for the CHA to find whites willing to live there. Essentially, “African
Americans were willing to be pioneers in largely white projects, but whites would not
stay long in black-majority projects, even when located close to white neighborhoods.”22
African Americans held no qualms about living as a minority in a project because their
previous housing situation was so terrible. Whites felt uncomfortable as soon as the racial
balance reached a point where they became the minority. The CHA had to deal with
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white resistance to integrated public housing and great African American demand for
their units. Racial quotas attempted to portray an illusion of integration when in reality
whites wanted no part in the effort. As the episode at Trumbull Park would show,
integration even when unplanned was extremely dangerous for African Americans.
Donald and Betty Howard, and their two young children, lived in a small
apartment on South Parkway in the Black Belt with Mrs. Howard’s grandmother.23
Fruitless in their search for more spacious accommodations, Donald and Betty Howard
applied for public housing their only alternative. The Howard’s motivation for moving to
Trumbull Park was a desire to escape their cramped housing situation. Low rents and
more amenities were attractive as well. The first African American family to live in the
Trumbull Park Homes, the Howard’s arrival showed that massive white resistance to the
presence of African Americans could end even the most noble integration efforts.
Built in the far South Side community of South Deering in 1938, Trumbull Park
Homes was one of Chicago’s first public housing projects. Constructed on vacant land in
a predominantly white neighborhood far away from the Black Belt, the projects included
three story apartment buildings and row houses.24 The surrounding community consisted
of second and third generation immigrants who resisted change and were suspicious of
low-income people. The CHA cautiously approached integration at projects like
Trumbull Park fearing another race riot like the infamous uprising in 1919. As early as
1940, whites living in the project feared integration when three Latinos were admitted.25
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Figure 12. Location of Chicago Housing Authority Developments, 1946.26
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Early in 1953, Donald and Betty Howard applied for public housing with the
CHA and were placed on a waiting list. Not content to wait, the Howards decided to drive
around Chicago looking for vacancies. They found a vacancy in the all white Trumbull
Park Homes. In May 1953, Betty, a very light skinned African American, applied and
was admitted into the Trumbull Park Homes. Donald, who was a much darker skin color,
was not present at the time of the application.27
On July 30, 1953, the Howard family moved into their new apartment. At first,
the Howard’s experienced no trouble from their neighbors. A few Latinos lived alongside
them who even appeared to be darker than the Howards.28 A few days after the Howards
arrived, the project manager visited their apartment and was surprised to discover an
African American family. News that a black family was living in the projects spread into
the surrounding community. On August 5, 1953, an unidentified resident hurled a brick
through the front window of the Howard’s apartment. For the next two weeks the
Howards barricaded themselves in their home as white residents heaved bricks at their
apartment.29
Whites used many forms of violence and intimidation to threaten the Howards
and even African Americans who lived outside the neighborhood. White violence
included throwing bricks at the apartment, slashing tires, verbal intimidation, and
attacking the police.30 Cars and buses driven by African Americans were stoned and
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whites burned convenience stores patronized by African Americans.31 Going for a walk
was dangerous and traveling to work required a police escort.32
Nearly one thousand rioters from the surrounding community packed the outskirts
of the project for two weeks. The South Deering Improvement Association (SDIA)
declared the neighborhood all white and organized bombings to intimidate the Howards
and other African American families. Providing legal and financial assistance to those
arrested in connection with the bombings, the SDIA was instrumental in organizing and
maintaining the intensity of the rioting.33 700 policemen attempted to protect the family
and their home. Between August 1953 and May 1955 over 200 adults were arrested. The
CHA declared that any tenants of the Trumbull Park homes arrested and convicted in
connection with the disturbances would be evicted.34 Since most rioters did not live in the
projects, the CHA’s threats did not deter them. Whites created an inhospitable, violent,
and chaotic living environment for the Howards and other African Americans who were
caught nearby.
In the fall of 1953, as the violence continued to threaten the family, the Howards
reached out to the NAACP for assistance. Already active working with white and African
Americans on integration in the city, the Chicago branch of the NAACP provided vital
legal protection and assistance to the Howard family. The NAACP paid for the Howard’s
legal fees and court costs when Donald was falsely accused of discharging a firearm at

31

Bowly Jr., The Poorhouse, 80.
Arnold R. Hirsch, “Massive Resistance in the Urban North: Trumbull Park Chicago
1953-1966,” Journal of American History 82, no. 2 (1995): 524,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082185 (accessed 4 October 2012).
33
Hirsch, “Massive Resistance,” 531.
34
Author Unkown, “Order Eviction of Convicted In Trumbull Row,” Chicago Tribune,
August 25, 1953.
32

76

white rioters in April 1954. Pressuring the CHA to end segregated housing, the NAACP
even filed suit to end all white projects. As it became clear the white violence was not
dissipating, the Howard’s considered leaving Trumbull Park. As their move became
imminent, the NAACP became more intimately involved with the family. Organizers
held meetings at the Howard’s home and a demonstration was held at a local baseball
field. When the CHA evicted the family for false income statements, the NAACP
suspected discrimination and prejudice from the SDIA.35 After an unsuccessful meeting
with Mayor Kennelly to stop the violence, the NAACP sent memos to the national offices
in New York and Washington D.C. The FBI and the Justice Department’s Civil Rights
Unit was asked to investigate and letters were written to President Eisenhower and
Attorney General Herbert Brownell.36
The stress of coping with the constant rioting took a toll on the Howard family.
Donald lost ten pounds and Betty was angry and resentful towards the rioters. They both
struggled to sleep at night.37 The police escorts to the grocery store became a nuisance. In
addition, the Howard’s presence created a chaotic and disorderly environment and the
CHA realized the Howards would eventually have to leave. As early as October 1953,
CHA Board Chairman Henry Kreuse was quoted in the Chicago Tribune remarking,
“Eventually the Howards will have to go.”38 On October 29, 1953 the CHA
unceremoniously evicted the Howards because of a false statement about the family’s
income. NAACP legal action prolonged their dismissal and prevented their eviction.
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Police and the other African American tenants at Trumbull Park believed that once the
Howard’s left, the violence would subside.39 The inevitable removal occurred in May
1954. The Howards left Trumbull Park after months of chaos, violence, and disorder.
Difficulties between the CHA and the SDIA were resolved and integration of
Trumbull Park continued. Mayor Kennelly forged an agreement with the SDIA to limit
black occupancy in Trumbull Park to six percent.40 Violence slowly began to subside.41
Meanwhile, Donald Howard, innocent victim of mob violence, issued a statement in the
Chicago Defender: “The residence of my family in Trumbull Park apartment has caused
us great physical suffering and mental anguish…Despite the suffering undergone with
my family, I had hoped that with the passage of time this organized form of barbarism
would subside. Instead the violence has grown with intensity.”42 The simple fact of the
Trumbull Park episode was that violence triumphed. Even though African Americans
remained in the projects, by the 1960s whites had maintained a racial homogeneity in the
neighborhood.43 Sustained, intense, and violent rioting proved successful in maintaining
white dominance in the community.
The removal of the Howards did not completely end the violence in Trumbull
Park. Between 1953 and 1958, sporadic harassment continued for African Americans.
One year after the Howard’s arrival, over 2,000 police had been deployed to Trumbull
Park to protect African Americans. Many police officers were sympathetic to the white
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rioters and the only major arrests were made by African American police officers.44 In
1955, three African American men were stoned by a mob of thirty people as they walked
to work.45 Two years after the rioting began, when African Americans showed their faces
around the South Deering neighborhood, they were treated as a, “public enemy, by redfaced belligerent white Americans who stare, glare and threaten them.”46 The Chicago
Defender continued to document examples of hostility towards African Americans in the
years after 1953. Ultimately, the end of 1955 saw the worst rioting come to an end.
Twenty-eight African American families lived in the projects and seemed content to
remain. A police presence was maintained until the late 1950s.47
The CHA’s response to the Trumbull Park fiasco changed the nature of its
progressive leadership. The downfall of Elizabeth Wood, the CHA executive secretary
and fierce supporter of African American rights, reflected a significant change. A
progressive and motivated leader, Elizabeth Wood was determined to provide affordable
integrated housing to Chicago’s poorest residents. Her attitudes reflected a strain of
postwar racial liberalism that intended to remedy the contradiction between American
values and the treatment of African Americans.
Elizabeth Wood’s background in social work and experience with low-income
communities gave her the motivation to provide affordable housing. Educated at the
University of Michigan, Wood taught poetry at Vassar College before moving to Chicago
during the Great Depression. In Chicago, she became a social worker who witnessed
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some of the worst living conditions in the Black Belt. Her firsthand experience with the
appalling housing conditions motivated Wood to get into housing reform.48 She became
executive secretary of the Chicago Housing Authority in 1937.
Wood and her cohorts at the CHA constituted a part of American postwar
liberalism that endeavored to solve the “American Dilemma.” The term, coined by
Swedish economist Gunnar Mydal in 1944, refers to the contradiction between American
values and the treatment of African Americans.49 Postwar liberalism strove to solve this
enduring contradiction using the expanded powers of the federal government after the
New Deal. The CHA is a perfect example. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Public Works
Administration (PWA) built three new housing projects in Chicago in the 1930
administered by the CHA.50 However, liberals faced an emerging African American
ghetto that showed no signs of dissolving.
As African American ghettoes emerged across the urban North in the 1950s,
postwar liberals were confronted with a vexing problem never before seen in America.
These ghettoes, “because they were located in the urban centers of the North and Westfar away from the Jim Crow South that represented the American dilemma in the eyes of
postwar liberals - these ghettoes remained outside of the purview of national political
attention.”51 American society had never experienced the postwar African American
ghettoes. Ethnic ghettoes had eventually broken up and lost their character. Liberals
recognized the problem but failed to identify complex economic, social, and political
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changes creating the postwar ghettoes. Labor market segregation and the impact of
deindustrialization on African Americans coupled with complex forms of racial
discrimination in housing and employment confined and concealed African Americans to
the ghetto.52
Wood believed that public housing was essential to providing opportunity for
disadvantaged residents. Integrated public housing would further increase economic
opportunity for disadvantaged residents by placing them in a structured, safe, and sanitary
environment. She successfully integrated the Cabrini Green on the near North Side,
LeClaire on the western edge of the city, and Archer Courts in the South Loop by placing
black and white families into a carefully managed racial balance. The optimal African
American occupancy of a project was 20 percent.53 This policy would not last. Whites
could afford to leave the inner city. This resulted in the CHA having to carefully select
whites that valued integrated housing. As whites left the city for the suburbs, the CHA
had to chose from an ever-decreasing number of suitable whites. African American
demand for public housing was much greater than white demand, making Wood’s effort
to integrate CHA projects very difficult.
The passage of legislation in 1948 to give the city council control over the
placement of public housing projects and the Trumbull Park disturbances in 1953
effectively ended the CHA’s effort to integrate public housing. Wood and the CHA
desired to build integrated public housing on vacant land in the southwest and northwest
sides of the city. Building on vacant land would not require the demolition of black
housing and displacement of the residents. The sites for public housing were in white
52
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neighborhoods and the aldermen representing these areas in the city council protested.
Their reaction prompted the passage of the Relocation Acts of 1948, giving the city
council veto power over the CHA in site selection.54 Elizabeth Wood and the CHA lost
the battle over site selection for their projects. From then on, public housing projects were
built exclusively in the black ghetto.
The Trumbull Park disturbances forced the removal of Elizabeth Wood from the
CHA, prompted changes in leadership and the abandonment of Wood’s passion for social
justice. When the Trumbull Park disturbances began in August 1953, Wood was on
vacation. She immediately returned to Chicago to deal with the situation. Following the
beginning of the commotion, the CHA decided to integrate all their projects. More
African American families moved into Trumbull Park and Wood was accused of trying to
incite racial violence.55
All of the violence and uproar surrounding Trumbull Park and the CHA took a
toll on Elizabeth Wood’s health. In 1954, she became ill with bronchitis and was
hospitalized.56 Taking the opportunity of Wood’s absence to perform an internal review,
the CHA Board of Commissioners published a report recommending she be removed. In
1954, Wood was fired.57 Wood was a determined progressive who, “went down fighting
for the rights of African Americans, but in the end, the Trumbull Park Homes mob riot
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triumphed.”58 Violence, racism, and discrimination overcame progressive attempts to fix
the disastrous housing conditions for African Americans.
The CHA Board of Commissioners rationalized Wood’s dismissal as a business
move. At the time of Wood’s firing, the CHA had become a multi million-dollar
corporation. Collecting more than $500,000 in rent per month, the CHA was the largest
landlord in Chicago.59 The CHA Board reasoned that a strong businessman was needed to
manage the organization. Former Korean War General William Keane was hired in 1954
to run the CHA. Kean quickly changed the CHA’s integration policy from carefully
managed quotas to open occupancy. Now whenever a white occupied unit went vacant,
the unit would immediately be provided to an African American. Under Wood, this unit
would have remained empty until a suitable white family was found. Quickly, CHA
projects became nearly all African American.60
With the abandonment of informal racial quotas, the CHA’s priorities shifted
from social justice and affordable housing, to values of production, stabilization, and
profit. Kean incorporated these values consistent with his military background. When
Richard Daley was elected Mayor in 1955, the CHA became his vehicle for urban
renewal. Daley authorized urban renewal funds to build massive public housing projects
in the existing black ghetto. Under Daley, CHA projects, such as the eight building
Stateway Gardens, and the Robert Taylor Homes, the largest public housing complex in
the United States, became depressing symbols of the entrapment of African Americans
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inside huge concrete buildings. By 1960, CHA projects were all African American and
Wood’s mission and passion for integration had been abandoned.61
The decrepit housing conditions in the Black Belt, the attempt to integrate
Trumbull Park, the experience of the Howard family, the dismissal of Elizabeth Wood,
and the ensuing collapse of the CHA as a vehicle for social justice were all parts of a
reaction to Chicago’s expanding African American population. Chicago’s black
population from 1940 to 1960, increased from 14 percent to 33 percent.62 By 1960, over
800,000 African Americans lived in Chicago. The Windy City had a higher African
American population than Mississippi and public housing contained more black residents
than Selma, Alabama.63 Confined to dense and decaying neighborhoods, African
Americans looked to the Chicago Housing Authority to improve their situation. The CHA
took on the burden of clearing the slums and building affordable public housing in their
place.
Projects on the outskirts of the city, such as a Trumbull Park, slowly became
integrated. Donald and Betty Howard represented the first wave of dozens of African
American families who bravely integrated public housing projects in hostile white
neighborhoods. The explosive white reaction to the Howard’s arrival in Trumbull Park
sparked institutional change at the CHA, forever altering the priorities of the
organization. While African Americans never left Trumbull Park, white homogeneity was
maintained. At the CHA, Elizabeth Wood’s unceremonious removal ushered in a new
era. Under new leadership, the organization became closely allied the Mayor Richard J.
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Daley. His urban renewal projects reshaped the ghetto into concrete high rises, allowing
all kinds of social problems. The Trumbull Park episode represents the beginning of the
complete collapse of Chicago public housing.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A PYRRHIC VICTORY: GAUTREAUX V. CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY
“What white Americans have never fully understood but what the Negro can
never forget – is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions
created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.”1 When African
American chairman Robert Taylor resigned in 1950, the CHA became a nearly all white
organization, intimately influencing the location of public housing in African American
neighborhoods. The CHA became an institution dominated by whites that accelerated and
cemented Chicago’s racial and economic segregation. The appointments of Alvin Rose,
Mayor Richard J. Daley’s former top welfare official and Charles Swibel, a lawyer and
Daley supporter, allowed Daley’s cohorts to outnumber the board’s more liberal
members. The only African American member of the CHA board was conservative
lawyer and war veteran Theophilus Mann, who had little appreciation for public housing.
Through these changes, Daley was able to deplete the CHA of its progressivism with
more conservative and loyal board members.2
With the city council and Daley’s appointments to the CHA board controlling site
selection, the Authority embarked on a massive decade long public housing construction
program that lasted from 1957 to 1968. This unprecedented binge of public housing
occurred at a time when the housing shortage in Chicago had eased substantially. Over
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the previous six years the total number of housing units in the city had increased by 5.3
percent. At the same time, the total number of families had increased by only 4.2 percent,
or 45,000. Moreover the number of vacant units in the city increased from 0.8 percent in
1950 to 1.7 percent in 1956.3 More vacant units meant more available housing. Despite
these promising developments in Chicago’s housing situation, the CHA still planned a
massive public housing construction program.
This public housing boom occurred at the same time as the climax of the civil
rights movement. Martin Luther King Jr. and the civil rights movement had finally
dismantled legal segregation across the South. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 extended true democracy to the American South. The era of
institutionalized white supremacy was over. However, the same month the Voting Rights
Act was passed, rioting erupted in the Watts section of Los Angeles. Two years later,
rioting exploded across cities in the Northeast and Midwest. The rioting in northern cities
shifted the focus of the civil rights movement to social and political inequalities for
African Americans in the urban North. While legal discrimination was being destroyed in
the South, a new form of urban residential segregation was being created. A combination
of public policy and private exclusion created inner cities all but devoid of economic
opportunity and metropolitan areas divided by race and class. This process began when
African Americans started leaving the South and heading north.
The second African American Great Migration from 1940 to 1960 drastically
changed the demographics of many Northeastern and Midwestern cities. In twenty years,
New York City’s black population increased by 137 percent, Chicago’s by 193 percent,
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Buffalo’s by 301 percent, and Milwaukee’s by 607 percent.4 By the mid 1960s, African
Americans made up 30 percent of Chicago’s population.5 The sheer numbers of African
Americans moving to these cities made it incredibly difficult to house them. A
combination of real estate discrimination, urban renewal, and federal policies that
allowed whites to move to the suburbs, and kept African Americans from joining them,
created metropolitan areas divided by race and class.
White reaction to the surge of African Americans in cities was born out of a
desire to protect their most valuable asset, their home. Before World War II, whites used
restrictive covenants to keep African Americans out of their neighborhoods. Restrictive
covenants were agreements between homeowners to not sell to African Americans or
others. In 1948, the Supreme Court declared restrictive covenants illegal, but this hardly
stopped the practice.6 Restrictive covenants sent a message to African Americans that
they were not wanted in the neighborhood.
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Figure 13. Percentage of African American Population by Census Tract Chicago, 1940.7
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Figure 14. Percentage of African American Population by Census Tract Chicago, 1950.8
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Figure 15. Percentage of African American Population by Census Tract Chicago, 1960.9
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Racial transition during the Great Migration years played a major role in the
segregation of the metropolitan area. As Chicago’s Black Belt expanded geographically
and increased in population, whites no longer bought homes in the area. Even when
homeowners and landlords lowered prices to try and attract whites, banks refused to give
whites mortgages in declining neighborhoods. As a result, African Americans were able
to enter these neighborhoods. Because there was so much African American demand,
owners and landlords were able to charge more for the same housing. Landlords did not
maintain properties, knowing there was a captive market for housing, resulting in
deterioration.10 Construction costs, local zoning and building laws also contributed to the
physical deterioration of African American areas.11 When African Americans tried to
leave these bad neighborhoods, discriminatory mortgage lending practices kept them
from fleeing to the suburbs.
Real estate practices like redlining ensured African Americans could not move
out of their neighborhoods. Redlining was the practice of marking neighborhoods on a
map to indicate areas a bank would not provide a mortgage. For some real estate agents,
it was considered a breach of ethics to provide loans to African Americans seeking homes
in white neighborhoods. In some states, a real estate agent’s license could be revoked if
they provided a mortgage to African Americans.12 The federal government’s
discriminatory mortgage practices allowed many middle class whites to flee to the
suburbs. Poor minorities were prevented from doing the same.13
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From the end of Reconstruction to the 1960s, white violence was the most evident
strategy employed to keep African Americans out of white neighborhoods. Homes
purchased by African Americans in white areas were razed, fire bombed, and stoned.
White residents yelled racial slurs and profanity at their new neighbors. The Chicago riots
of 1919 and the Trumbull Park disturbances of 1953-1957 are prominent examples of the
shameful behavior of whites in response to the presence of African Americans in their
neighborhoods.14
Urban renewal was another white response to the burgeoning black population.
The city cleared the slums and the residents were relocated into concrete housing
developments. Industrial warehouses and superhighways surrounded these projects.
These new projects housed thousands of residents but their consequences were far more
painful. These new projects produced, “something of a historical geographical paradox:
the new projects were far superior to the horrendous slums they replaced, but inscribed a
more severe isolation from the decentralizing urban economy.”15 Slums were cleared and
replaced by concrete public housing monoliths, housing thousands of low income African
Americans. Chicago historian Arnold Hirsch calls these projects the “second ghetto.” The
first ghetto was the slums, tenements, and kitchenette apartments. The second ghetto was
enshrined in the form of massive concrete housing projects.
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Construction of the second ghetto began in earnest in the 1950s and 1960s. The
CHA planned to nearly double the total units they managed to 27,026 within four years at
a cost of $317 million dollars.16 Authority reports estimated that one new public housing
development would be built each month.17 From 1954 to 1956 the number of people on
the CHA wait list dropped from 45,000 families to only 15,000. So why would the CHA
plow ahead with more public housing? The answer was twofold: increased federal money
and the still deplorable conditions in most housing for the poor.18 Federal funding had
strict cost and land use requirements. In order to accommodate the requirements for
density and land use, the CHA decided to build large high-rise projects that could hold
thousands of low-income people on small blocks of land.
The concentration of high-rise structures along State Street is a prominent
example. The Dearborn Homes (1950), Harold Ickes Homes (1955), Stateway Gardens
(1958) and the Robert Taylor Homes (1962) created an ominous corridor known as the
“Chicago Wall” that stretched for miles.19 When the Raymond Hilliard Center was
constructed in 1966, the row of public housing stretched for a total of thirty-four blocks
and housed nearly 30 percent of all CHA residents. Twenty-eight sixteen-story buildings
made up the Robert Taylor Homes, which housed 27,000 residents in over 4,000 units.20
The ten-story tall Stateway Gardens had over 1,600 units. Harold Ickes had 797 units
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over eight buildings, three of which were over nine stories tall. Built in 1957, Henry
Horner Homes on the near West Side consisted of 920 units in nine elevator buildings.
On the near North side, extensions to Cabrini Green gave it 3,607 units in fifteen
buildings.21 These tall structures proved to be an efficient and cost effective method to
house low-income people.
By the late 1950s the CHA was fast moving towards all African American
occupancy. In 1955, two thirds of CHA tenants were African American and African
Americans made up 73 percent of the families moving into CHA units. By 1959, 85
percent of CHA tenants were African American. Additionally, the CHA’s infatuation
with high-rise structures in inner city neighborhoods ensured that all of its family housing
would be African American. Lawyer and public housing historian, Devereux Bowly Jr.
writes, “the conclusion is inescapable that the locations for new projects were selected by
the CHA, and the by the political leadership of Chicago, to contain and segregate the
poor, black population.”22 This great era of public housing construction systematically
segregated African Americans into what they thought were cost effective high-rises
despite the fact that these buildings isolated residents from the decentralizing
metropolitan economy. The social, economic, and political costs of this terrible public
housing failure are still evident.
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Figure 16. Stateway Gardens.23

Figure 17. Cabrini Green Extension, 1958.24
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This was the housing situation in Chicago in 1966; the year Martin Luther King
Jr. brought the civil rights movement to the Windy City. While King and the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) campaigned against school and housing
segregation, a new generation of African American activists, black and white liberals,
and other community groups began to fight Chicago’s racist housing policies.25 They
fought primarily through litigation. In August 1966, a group of CHA tenants filed a class
action lawsuit in federal court against the CHA and executive director Alvin Rose
charging that the CHA since 1950 had built projects exclusively in African American
neighborhoods and the ghetto. The claimed the CHA tried to avoid constructing projects
in white neighborhoods.26 The tenants also filed a separate lawsuit against the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for funding the discriminatory
public housing projects. The lengthy Gautreaux v. CHA lawsuit was an epic case of
litigation contested all the way to the Supreme Court. Some observers even consider it
more important that the school desegregating case Brown v. Board of Education.27
In 1965, the Chicago Housing Authority was planning another public housing
development. The proposed State Street-Cermak project would further extend Chicago’s
“wall” of public housing along State Street. Critics panned the State Street-Cermak
development as an unnecessary extension of the ghetto that did not account for large
families and would add to the economic and racial segregation in Chicago. More lowincome people with similar social and economic problems would be concentrated in high-
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rise buildings.28 Harold Baron, leader of the Chicago Urban League and organizer in the
West Side Federation, an African American activist group, complained about the city’s
pattern of building public housing in low income and blighted African American
neighborhoods. For years, the media and other civic groups had complained about the
discriminatory public housing patterns but without effect. This time the difference would
be that the complaint was based on the recently passed Civil Rights Act of 1964.29
Baron wrote a letter of complaint to the Housing and Home Finance Agency
(HHFA) in 1965.30 He complained that CHA site selection discriminated against African
Americans by not giving them an opportunity to live outside the ghetto. Marie McGuire
at the HHFA wrote back that the sites in Chicago were acceptable by federal standards.
94 percent of CHA applicants were African American and indicated a preference to live
on the West and South Sides. Most of the CHA projects were located in these areas. She
also noted that the city council had control over site selection, not the CHA. She
concluded that denying the State Street-Cermak project would mean denying thousands
of low income Chicagoans much needed housing. As far as the federal government was
concerned, the locations of CHA projects were fine.31 Later on, McGuire’s letter would
be important evidence showing the federal government was compliant with Chicago’s
discriminatory housing policies.
Baron was disappointed by McGuire’s logic. By her reasoning, a local governing
body, like the city council, could trump Section VI of the Civil Rights Act. Section VI
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prohibits discrimination in programs funded by the federal government.32 Baron sought
legal counsel. In January of 1966, Baron met Alexander Polikoff, a corporate attorney in
Chicago who also worked public interest cases. During the meeting, Baron introduced the
basics of his complaint and the letter in response from the HHFA. The main problem for
Baron was the logic that local governing bodies could impose “local approval
requirements” on federally funded programs. Agencies would not have to comply with
Section VI of the Civil Rights Act because they were acting under local laws.
Recognizing the legitimacy of Baron’s complaint, Polikoff agreed to take on Baron’s
case with a team of ACLU lawyers.33
Polikoff directed Baron to find potential plaintiffs for the lawsuit. He needed
African Americans who lived in CHA projects and had been forced to live in African
American areas but who preferred to live elsewhere.34 One of the tenants found was
Dorothy Gautreaux. A resident of Dearborn Homes, Gautreaux was a neighborhood
leader who had fought for housing rights.35 Because her name stood out, Polikoff decided
to place her name at the front of the lawsuit. Gautreaux v. CHA became the name of the
case.
The problem with the case would be proving the CHA had intentionally
discriminated against African Americans. Another question for Polikoff was whether
CHA site selection denied African American equal housing opportunity. Polikoff would
need evidence proving the CHA purposefully segregated African Americans.
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In addition to the CHA lawsuit, Polikoff decided to file a separate suit against the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. The HHFA had been reorganized into
HUD in the 1965 Housing and Urban Development Act.36 Arguing that the federal
government was complicit in the CHA’s discrimination because it funded the
construction of public housing, Polikoff believed he had a strong case. McGuire’s letter
to Baron showed the federal government was aware of the discrimination. Suing the
federal government however, was more complex and difficult than suing the Chicago
Housing Authority. Federal lawyers had more legal resources and were more
resourceful.37 There was no question the cases against both the CHA and HUD would be
incredibly difficult.
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Figure 18. Chicago Housing Authority Project Map, 1938-1970.38
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On August 9, 1966, Polikoff filed two class action lawsuits in Chicago federal
court, one against the CHA, and the other against HUD. The plaintiffs charged that the
CHA since 1950 had intentionally built public housing projects in African American
neighborhoods. In addition, the lawsuit charged the CHA had deliberately tried to avoid
putting projects in white neighborhoods. This had prevented the plaintiffs and other
African American tenants from the right to live in public housing outside African
American areas.39 The lawsuit charged that the CHA and HUD had violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Gautreaux v. CHA had begun.
By the time Polikoff filed the lawsuit in 1966, a surprising shift had occurred in
American opinion towards public housing. In the early years of the CHA, when Elizabeth
Wood and Robert Taylor championed public housing as a means of social mobility for
African Americans, social reformers strongly supported public housing. Conservatives,
on the other hand, despised it. Government intrusion into the housing market would hurt
the private market, they argued. Twenty years later when Gautreaux v. CHA was filed a
fascinating switch had occurred. Some of the defenders of large-scale public housing
were old conservatives. Social reformers, on the other hand, strongly criticized the highrise projects.40 The high-rise public housing construction boom of the 1950s and 1960s
had changed the terms of debate on public housing. This unbelievable switch in support
for public housing created the background for Polikoff’s lawsuit against the CHA.
By 1966, the Chicago Housing Authority’s tenants were virtually all African
American. All of its applicants were African American. All of its projects were located in
39
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African American neighborhoods.41 Part of Polikoff’s lawsuit against the CHA borrowed
from the iconic Brown v. Board of Education opinion saying, “segregation in the black
ghetto had detrimental effects on the blacks who lived there, including isolation from the
larger society and school segregation for the children.”42 Polikoff knew he could prove
the statistical outcomes of the CHA’s public housing projects were discriminatory. It
would be more difficult however, to prove their intent was discriminatory. Complicating
the issue was the selection of Judge Richard B. Austin to hear the case. Austin was
known as a tough, law-and-order judge and was far from liberal on issues of race.43
Polikoff knew he would have a difficult case in court.
In response to the lawsuit, the CHA’s attorneys presented evidence in their
defense showing they had not intended to discriminate against African Americans. First,
the CHA argued that the city council was the institution segregating African Americans,
not the CHA.44 Since the city council had veto control over site selection, the CHA could
submit as many projects in white areas as they wanted and they still would be rejected by
the city council. The CHA did not do that. The CHA also argued that the plaintiffs had no
right to complain about housing discrimination because they had chosen to live in
African American neighborhoods when they applied.45 In Dorothy Gautreaux’s case,
Dearborn Homes was located in a community that was 95 percent African American.
Finally, the CHA presented a map of Chicago’s community areas and the location of
CHA projects across the city. Since 1950, the attorney’s argued the CHA had developed
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20,000 apartments. Almost 30 percent of the units were constructed in majority white
neighborhoods at the time.46 The map did not show that most of these neighborhoods
were undergoing rapid racial transition.
Polikoff countered the CHA arguments with evidence of CHA discrimination. His
legal assistants uncovered a memo from 1955 between CHA executive director William
Keane and an alderman agreeing to a veto system that would keep CHA projects out of
white areas. This veto system would prevent the CHA from submitting a list of sites until
the aldermen representing the specific wards for planned projects had approved them.47
This “aldermanic privilege” allowed aldermen to screen CHA sites. They could reject
projects in white wards before the list even reached the council. Next, there was clear
evidence the CHA had intentionally kept four projects all white. One of these all white
projects was located in Bridgeport, home of mayor Richard J. Daley.48 In two other biracial projects, the CHA kept the quota of African Americans low.
To counter the CHA map of Chicago’s community areas in 1950 and the
argument that their projects were built in majority white areas at the time, Polikoff had a
new map created based on census tracts. The CHA’s community areas map was based on
large, vaguely defined community areas. Census tracts could better determine the racial
composition of a neighborhood. The new map showed thirty-three CHA projects built
since 1950 were located in census tracts over 84 percent African American. Twenty-six
of the projects were in areas over 95 percent African American.49
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On the issue of location of preferences, Polikoff’s interviews with Dorothy
Gautreaux revealed a different story than the one the CHA was telling. Before applying
with the CHA, Gautreaux was living in a one-bedroom apartment with a family of five.
She was desperate to leave. When she applied with the CHA, the interviewer told her
Dearborn Homes was the best chance for quick placement. Polikoff’s research at the
CHA archives revealed interviewers were instructed to direct African Americans toward
projects that may open up faster since there was a long wait list. Additionally, Gautreaux
knew the CHA had racial quotas in their mixed projects and had few white projects. She
knew she could not get in a white project promptly. Her options were limited. The only
open projects were in all African American areas.50 Essentially, the CHA steered
desperate African American families into all-black projects.
In 1967, Austin dismissed the CHA’s arguments. With the aldermanic privilege,
racial steering from all white projects, and the census map, Polikoff had three powerful
pieces of evidence to prove the CHA’s discrimination. Aldermanic privilege showed the
CHA knew full well that it was discriminating against African Americans. The census
tract map showed 98 percent of the 21,000 CHA units built since 1950 were in African
American areas. Finally, the Kean agreement made it easier for the council to reject
controversial sites, limiting debates and bad publicity. The CHA had corroborated with
the council in the discrimination.51
On February 10, 1969, Austin ruled in favor of Gautreaux. In his opinion he
wrote that the CHA had practiced racial discrimination in tenant assignment and site
selection. Additionally, the CHA had imposed racial quotas on four white projects;
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Trumbull Park, Lathrop, Lawndale Gardens, and Bridgeport.52 Austin also discovered by
1969, 99 percent of CHA tenants were African American and 99.5 percent of CHA
projects were located in predominantly African American neighborhoods.53 The statistics
alone proved discrimination. The CHA’s own documents, like the Kean agreement,
showed intentional discrimination, a violation of the Constitution’s Equal Protection
Clause. Austin came down hard on the CHA declaring, “neither the laudable goal of
providing housing nor the possibility that the aldermen were not personally racist but
were simply reflecting the sentiments of their constituents could justify a government
policy of keeping blacks out of white neighborhoods.”54 The CHA had no excuses. Not
even racist politicians should have kept them from building projects in white
neighborhoods. The ruling effectively labeled the entire CHA post war building program
racist and unconstitutional. Austin’s ruling was the first in the entire nation in which a
local housing authority was found guilty of discrimination.55
Unfortunately, Dorothy Gautreaux would not live to experience the victory. In
August of 1968, she passed away from a kidney failure. When Martin Luther King Jr.
visited Chicago, Gautreaux marched with him for open housing. She was by far the most
passionate and articulate plaintiff on the impact of African American public housing
isolation.56
The ruling in Gautreaux came just two years after rioting in inner cities across
United States in the summer of 1967 shocked the nation and President Lyndon B.
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Johnson commissioned an investigation on the causes of the rioting. Published in 1967,
the Kerner Commission Report revealed the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and a
lack of economic opportunity as the primary reasons the nation’s inner cities erupted in
violence. One of the most famous passages of the report stated, “Our nation is moving
towards two societies, one black, one white, — separate and unequal.”57 The findings of
the Kerner Report warned about the impact of inner city isolation. The timing seemed
perfect for the Gautreuax case. Austin even echoed some of the Kerner Reports’
sentiments in his opinion saying, “existing patterns of racial segregation must be reversed
if there is to be chance of averting the desperately intensifying division of whites and
Negroes in Chicago.”58 A clear warning had been sent. Racial and economic segregation
were destroying inner cities and if the nation did not act quickly, the problems would
become worse. Polikoff intended to at least try to remedy the problem of racial
segregation through Gautreaux v. CHA.
Austin’s order called for Polikoff and the CHA to formulate a potential plan to
alleviate the public housing segregation in Chicago. Polikoff proposed that for every one
unit built in African American neighborhoods, four must be built in white
neighborhoods.59 Austin then created a “Limited Public Housing Area.” This area
included census tracts with a 30 percent or more non-white population. Public housing
could not be built in these areas. He also extended a one-mile buffer zone on the
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perimeter of this area to account for racial transition. Finally, Austin included a “General
Public Housing Area” on the North, Northwest, and Southwest sides. These would be the
only areas that could receive public housing.60 The order prevented the CHA from
building projects in heavily African American neighborhoods.
Austin then ordered the CHA to end its discriminatory tenant practices. The CHA
had to open 50 percent of any new project to neighborhood residents. The remaining
units had to be available to those on the wait list. The CHA wait list was 90 percent
African American.61 700 units had to be built in white neighborhoods. Austin prohibited
the construction of projects greater than three stories. No more gigantic public housing
complexes like the Robert Taylor Homes would ever be built. Austin’s order also limited
the concentration of projects in the same neighborhoods.62 Finally, in order to comply
with the requirements on building in white neighborhoods, the CHA was permitted to
build a third of the units in suburban Cook County. Unfortunately, Austin’s 1969 order
effectively ended public housing construction in Chicago. The court ordered remedy had
the effect of preventing construction of projects in high need African American areas
until projects in white areas had been built.63 Austin’s order did ensure an end to the
CHA’s discrimination.
Nine months after Austin’s order, the CHA had not even started conversations
with suburban housing officials on site locations. The CHA claimed they wanted to hold
off on releasing a list of suburban sites until after the 1971 mayoral election. In response,
Austin issued another order requiring the CHA to submit a plan within a month. CHA
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decided to prolong the issue by appealing Austin’s order all the way to the Supreme
Court. On March 4, 1971, the Supreme Court refused to hear their arguments. However,
the CHA had successfully pushed the revelation of the suburban sites past the February
1971 Democratic Primary but not the general election.64 Finally, after two years of
delays, the CHA submitted a list of 275 proposed sites for 1,746 units.65
By the time CHA finally submitted their scattered site plan, demographic trends
had changed America’s metropolitan areas. In the late 1960s, whites were fleeing central
cities for the suburbs three times as fast as they did in the early 1960s. The poor and
minorities were being concentrated in central cities. In response to these changes,
President Lyndon B. Johnson urged Congress to view cities as metropolitan areas instead
of as fragmented municipalities. Unfortunately, there was no action from Congress.66 For
the CHA, white flight meant fewer white neighborhoods to build public housing. Further
delays would prevent the Authority from having to face the difficult task of finding
enough suitable land in white areas to build projects.
Despite these changes, the CHA was finally on the way to scattered site selection.
Polikoff shifted to the lawsuit against HUD, now called Hills v. Gautreaux. The plaintiffs
charged that HUD was complicit in the CHA’s discrimination. The lawsuit against HUD
forced Polikoff to examine the national trends in public housing and integration. By
1971, Richard Nixon bad been president for three years. His secretary of Housing and
Urban Development was George Romney, father of 2012 Republican Presidential
Candidate Mitt Romney. Appointed in 1968, Romney was a former rival to Nixon in the
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Republican Presidential primaries. Nixon got his revenge by placing Romney in a less
prestigious department.67
Romney and Nixon’s views on integration differed. It was well known in Nixon’s
administration that housing segregation was a serious problem. Nixon’s Report on
National Housing Goals in April of 1970 supported the policy of metropolitan housing to
end segregation and fight poverty in central cities.68 Despite this, Nixon backed away
from the issue because he anticipated opposition from middle class suburban whites.
George Romney, on the other hand, strongly supported a policy to integrate the
suburbs. Romney was much more liberal on the issue of integration than Nixon and took
an interest in building public housing outside the ghettos.69 Romney recognized just as
much as Nixon did, the problems of a segregated society saying, “the problem is the most
important one that America has ever faced, is now facing and will ever face, bar none. It
must be solved and we, the citizens must solve it.”70 As Secretary of HUD, Romney
attached fair housing requirements for municipalities applying for urban renewal funding.
The enticements to integrate suburban communities did not go over well. Warren
Michigan, a suburb of Detroit chose to forego millions of dollars for urban renewal rather
than provide public housing for minorities.71 The controversy surrounding Romney’s
requirements ultimately scuttled his plan to integrate the suburbs.
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Nixon effectively killed Romney’s plan to integrate the suburbs. He announced
the federal government would not impose public housing on suburban communities. At
the same time though, Nixon admitted that the federal government was the only way lowincome minorities could move out of the central city and obtain jobs. He acknowledged
racial segregation was a major problem but refused to devote federal resources to address
the predicament. Back in Chicago, Alexander Polikoff realized that Daley’s reelection,
Nixon’s stance on integration, and available HUD funding meant there was no urgency
for scattered site public housing in the suburbs.72
While all of this was occurring on the national stage, Judge Austin denied
Polikoff’s suit against HUD. He wrote that as a judge he had no authority to influence the
policies of the federal government. Even though HUD knew about CHA’s discrimination,
McGuire’s letter showed this, HUD was not complicit in the discrimination. Polikoff
immediately appealed the decision. In 1971, the appeals court ruled that HUD was liable
for funding the CHA’s discriminatory public housing program. HUD’s good faith in the
CHA to administer a responsible program was irrelevant. The idea that a federal agency
would have a lesser duty than a local entity was unthinkable. HUD’s funding was
discriminatory.73
By February 1972, the City Council had still not approved the CHA’s list of sites.
Daley and the Council had purposefully stalled the program. Polikoff and the plaintiffs
filed another complaint against Daley and all fifty aldermen.74 Polikoff asked Austin to
suspend the veto power of the council. This power dates back to the 1947 Illinois

72

Ibid, 92.; Hunt, Blueprint for Disaster, 253.
Polikoff, Waiting for Gautreaux, 94; 101.
74
Bowly, The Poorhouse, 192.
73

111

Redevelopment Act, which allowed the city council the ability to veto site locations for
CHA projects. Austin did suspend this veto but the CHA and city council appealed all the
way to the Supreme Court again. Finally in January of 1974, the Supreme Court refused
to hear the case. The city council had finally lost its veto power over the CHA, five years
after Austin’s original 1969 ruling.75
With the obstacles to public housing in white neighborhoods finally dismantled,
Polikoff began to work on a remedial plan to integrate the suburbs. Polikoff wanted
Austin to order that metropolitan relief was necessary and legally possible. White flight
to the suburbs in the 1960s meant there were not enough white neighborhoods with
suitable vacant land to develop projects. During a November 1972 hearing, Polikoff
called Philip Hauser, a sociology professor at the University of Chicago to testify. Hauser
testified that by the turn of the century, there would be no census tracts with less than 30
percent African American population. Any remedial plan would not work because there
would no longer be any suitable census tracts to locate public housing. Austin had to
order the CHA to build projects in the suburbs. Polikoff’s plan called for the suburbs to
have only half of the new public housing in the city and required public housing to be
built in the city before it could be built in the suburbs.76
A recent school desegregating case in Detroit provided some legal precedent.77 In
Milliken v. Bradley, Detroit public schools had been deliberately segregated, much like
the CHA public housing projects. The judge ordered a metropolitan remedy, which would
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involve busing African American students to schools in the suburbs.78 Unfortunately for
Polikoff, the appeals process for Milliken v. Bradley led to the Supreme Court. In 1974,
the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision by a 5-4 ruling. Essentially, the
Court ruled a metropolitan solution to school desegregation was not appropriate because
the suburban school districts had not discriminated. Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote in
his opinion that unless intentional discrimination had occurred in the suburbs, or
suburban districts had drawn discriminatory boundaries, forcing suburban districts to
integrate would be wrong. Basically, the scope of the violation should determine the
scope of the remedy.79
The decision in Milliken v. Bradley represented a step back in the effort to
integrate America’s schools and metropolitan areas. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Thurgood Marshall echoed the findings of the Kerner Commission, writing, “in the short
run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas be divided
up each into two cities—one white, the other black, but it is a course I predict, our people
will ultimately regret.”80 Marshall correctly envisioned a metropolitan future where
suburban areas were made up of affluent whites and the inner city by low income
minorities. The appeals court judge also vehemently disagreed with the Supreme Court
decision, writing, “I know of no decision by the Supreme Court of the United States since
the Dred Scott decision which is so fraught with disaster for this country.”81 The decision
in Milliken v. Bradley meant efforts to integrate schools that had not discriminated could
not be part of a remedy to discrimination in inner city schools. Effectively ending school
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desegregation, Milliken v. Bradley was a major setback to all the accomplishments of the
civil rights movement during Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency.
The reversal in Milliken v. Bradley was a serious blow to Polikoff’s dreams of
metropolitan integration but there was reason for optimism. The case applied to schools,
not housing however. Consequently, Polikoff would try to reframe the issue to avoid
legal conflict with Milliken. Before the court of appeals Polikoff argued public housing
was an issue that had its roots in the federal government not in local government like
schools. He also presented evidence of predominantly African American projects in the
suburbs. The suburbs had discriminated too. Remedying housing discrimination must
include the suburbs.82
On August 26, 1974, the court of appeals ordered HUD to remedy its past
discrimination by building new projects in suburban counties north and west of
Chicago.83 The judges accepted the fact that housing was different than schools and there
was also evidence of discrimination in the suburbs. Unfortunately, HUD decided to
appeal the decision and petitioned the Supreme Court to hear their case. Polikoff argued
that it would premature for the Supreme Court to hear Gautreaux because Austin had not
yet even ordered a metropolitan remedy. There was no conflict with Milliken and a
metropolitan policy was the right solution.84
Despite Polikoff’s best efforts, on May 13, 1975, the Supreme Court granted
HUD’s petition to hear the case. Once again, the Supreme Court was placed between
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discriminated against African Americans and the federal government.85 The justices
would hear arguments about whether it was appropriate to allow federally subsidized
rental units for low-income minority residents in the suburbs in order to remedy
Chicago’s discrimination. In January of 1976, Polikoff went to Washington D.C. to argue
his case. Ten years after the original filing of the Gautreaux case, the effort desegregate
Chicago public housing had led all the way to the Supreme Court.
Polikoff was skeptical of his prospects to win the case. Richard Nixon had
appointed four conservative justices in the span of a few years.86 It was unlikely that they
would agree with Polikoff’s arguments. The court’s reversal in the Milliken case also set
legal precedent for HUD’s argument that a metropolitan policy for federally subsidized
housing was wrong. Solicitor General Robert Bork argued it would also be incredibly
difficult to force 300 cities, villages, and townships in the Chicago metropolitan area to
accept low-income African American public housing tenants in order to remedy an act of
segregation that occurred entirely in the central city.87
Before the Supreme Court, Polikoff argued that a metropolitan remedy to housing
discrimination that had occurred in Chicago was necessary. He argued that housing is
different than schools. Unlike the Milliken case, Gautreaux was an issue of the housing
market. School districts were geopolitical units while the housing market included the
entire Chicago metropolitan area. Despite this obvious distinction, Chief Justice Warren
Burger remained fixated on the innocent suburban townships. While Polikoff was still
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skeptical of his chances, he believed he had made a strong argument for integrating the
suburbs.88
On April 26, 1976, the justices ruled 8-0 in favor of the plaintiffs.89 The Supreme
Court upheld the court of appeals decision to allow subsidized housing for low-income
minorities in the suburbs. The plaintiffs won.
The decision in Hills v. Gautreaux would help extend scattered site public
housing into the suburbs in the form of federally subsidized housing programs and rental
subsidies.90 In the Supreme Court opinion, the justices agreed that the relevant
geographic area was the Chicago housing market, not the city limits. The justices ordered
that creation of low cost public housing for minorities in white suburbs would relieve
racial segregation in the city. It was a milestone victory for civil rights groups who
believed opening up the suburbs to public housing was the only way to integrate
schools.91 Most satisfyingly, the decision was in sharp contrast to Milliken v. Bradley.
Perhaps America had not closed the door to integration just yet.
If the plaintiffs could get Richard Austin to approve a plan for metropolitan relief,
they could get access to HUD funding for its Section 8 program. Section 8 allows
qualified low-income public housing residents to find privately owned apartments in the
suburbs. The federal government made up the difference between the rent and twenty five
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percent of the resident’s income.92 Federally subsidized housing in the suburbs was a
major victory for Polikoff, who wrote, “the holy grail of a public housing program, in
which the middle class affluent white neighborhoods of suburbia would have to accept a
fair share of the region’s public housing poor was now attainable.”93 No longer would
low-income minorities have to be confined to central cities without access to good
schools and jobs. The suburbs would have to help remedy decades of local and federal
policies that segregated poor minorities in inner city public housing high-rises.
While the decision was being celebrated, African American groups viewed
Gautreaux as a “hollow victory.”94 Public housing was desperately needed in African
American neighborhoods and was not being built until some had been constructed in
white neighborhoods. On the more extreme side, some African Americans believed the
Gautreaux case was part of a conspiracy to move them out of central city
neighborhoods.95
Over the span of Gautreaux v. CHA and Hills v. Gautreaux, America had seemed
to accept segregation as a way of life. At the end of the 1960s, the civil rights movement
had dismantled legal segregation and discrimination but a new, more insidious, and
dangerous form had taken its place. Polikoff writes:
“The years of Nixon rule had begun with the nation’s recognition in the Kerner
reports…that government policy had created a two-societies plague on America.
It was imperative that the plague be eradicated. Yet in a few short years the
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country had been moved to a sanctimonious acceptance of it and an intellectually
indefensible closure of the judicial route to change.”96
While Gautreaux v. CHA and Hills v. Gautreaux ultimately succeeded in dismantling
state sponsored segregation, by the time the litigation had ended, the nation had grown
tired of the issue. Racial and economic segregation had become acceptable. This
acceptance made integration even more challenging as Polikoff implemented a program
to move low income African Americans via HUD’s Section 8 program into the suburbs.
The Gautreaux program began moving CHA tenants out of the projects and into
subsidized private units in the suburbs. Beginning in 1976 and lasting for twenty years,
7,100 low-income African American families received counseling, assistance, and rent
certificates to relocate out of public housing projects.97 Potential families were carefully
screened for good housekeeping habits and whether they would be able to adapt to life in
the suburbs. Moving to suburbia meant an end to the crime, drugs, poor schools, and
poverty of the city. However it also meant an end to churches, family, friends, and
moving to scary and sometimes hostile territory.98 The move to the suburbs meant a
higher quality of life and most significantly, a better opportunity for the children, but at
the cost of losing social networks.
Many of the neighborhoods were 25 miles from the city. The Gautreaux families’
new communities had low crime rates, low poverty rates, and good public schools. These
positive improvements in standards of living had a fantastic impact on the Gautreaux
families, especially the children. Of the children who moved to the suburbs, they were
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four times more likely to graduate high school, twice as likely to attend college, and more
likely to be employed.99 The Gautreaux program was an extraordinary success and was
the basis for HUD’s 1992 national “Moving to Opportunity” program. Over four years,
“Moving to Opportunity” relocated 1,700 randomly selected public housing residents out
of high poverty areas in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York.100
Many observers considered the Gautreaux program an astounding success.
Over the course of fourteen years, from 1966 to 1980, Gautreaux v. CHA and
Hills v. Gautreaux had become lengthy and successful litigation but had effectively
ended public housing construction in Chicago during that time. Between 1969 and 1974,
little progress was made except on the number and location of projects. From 1969 to
1980, only 114 apartments had been built. By 1983, 600 units had been built but because
of construction costs, most of these existing structures had just been rehabilitated.
Austin’s original order prohibiting public housing in African American neighborhoods
until some units had been built in white areas denied housing in high need
neighborhoods.101 In order to accelerate the construction of public housing in Chicago,
the plaintiffs once again asked the courts to intervene.
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On June 17, 1981 Judge John P. Crowley signed a consent decree allowing
federal officials to grant rent subsidies to 7,100 poor families to move out of the ghetto
and into integrated neighborhoods across the city. The order also divided Chicago into
white, black, and revitalizing zones. Most of the new public housing construction would
take place in revitalizing zones in up and coming, integrated neighborhoods like Hyde
Park and Rogers Park. These neighborhoods were undergoing gentrification. As wealthier
residents moved in to central city neighborhoods, they displaced poor African Americans
who could not afford the higher rents. The public housing would give low income
African Americans a chance to stay in these revitalizing zones. Two thirds of public
housing would be built in these revitalizing areas on the fringe of the ghetto. Austin’s
previous ruling called for six out of every ten units to be constructed in white
neighborhoods. Crowley’s order finally was an end to years of litigation but recognized
the realities of race in Chicago. The courts stopped trying to integrate all white
neighborhoods and settled for integrated communities.102 The Crowley order was a step
back from integrating white neighborhoods but was a merciful conclusion to the endless
litigation.
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Figure 19. Chicago Housing Authority sites, 1981.103
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Gautreaux v. CHA and Hills v. Gautreaux were epic court cases that ended legal
housing segregation in Chicago and helped shape national anti-poverty housing policy.
Unfortunately, the end of public housing construction in Chicago in order to satisfy court
ordered integration requirements gave Gautreaux the appearance of sacrificing the
homeless to serve liberal ideas of integration.104 The length of the case meant by the time
it could have effect, there was no money to back it.105 Gautreaux was a failure ultimately
because it took fourteen years. While Gautreaux may have been a well-intentioned
failure, it certainly drew awareness to the problem of racial and economic segregation.
Another lesson of Gautreaux was that the creation of the African American ghetto
in Chicago had taken generations and would take more than a court order to dismantle.
While Gautreaux was a landmark case, it merely removed the restrictions to integration.
This did not mean people would integrate voluntarily. The remedy is not actual
integration, but the freedom to integrate voluntarily. Gautreaux accomplished the
removal of restrictions to integrate but Polikoff and the plaintiffs soon realized voluntary
integration is much harder to accomplish.106
The last great irony of Gautreaux is that once the CHA finally started on scattered
site public housing in the early 1980s, HUD funding was being cut. Ronald Reagan was
elected president in 1980 and during his term he slashed HUD’s budget. In response to
Reagan’s budget busting cuts to public housing funding, Chicago Mayor Jane Byrne was
forced to redirect funding for scattered site public housing to cover CHA operating
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expenses. The CHA’s fiscal issues forced the mayor to end the program.107 Sadly, a
viable and successful anti-poverty housing program was scuttled due to budget cuts.
Gautreaux v. CHA had evolved from a simple case of ending public housing
discrimination into a plan to relocate low income African Americans from CHA projects
into the suburbs. There is no doubt Gautreaux was a legal success. The plaintiffs forced
the CHA to stop its discriminatory practices and even made metropolitan integration
possible. Gautreaux also showed the limits of litigation and court ordered integration.
The courts removed restrictions to integration but could not force it. Gautreaux was the
beginning of a long process to break down state sponsored mechanisms for African
American residential segregation. Reversing decades of intentional segregation in one
lawsuit proved to be impossible. If anything, the Gautreaux lawsuit revealed the depths
of racial and economic segregation in Chicago and how the process of ending it will take
longer than anyone can anticipate.
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CONCLUSION
In the summer of 1966, the same year Alexander Polikoff and Dorothy Gautreaux
filed their lawsuit to end the Chicago Housing Authority’s discriminatory housing
patterns, Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC) combined with the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO)
to create the Chicago Freedom Movement. The Chicago Freedom Movement would be
King’s first organized movement in the urban North. Determined to end school
segregation, achieve fair housing, greater employment, better schools, and removal of the
slums, King used marches and rallies to draw national attention to the situation of African
Americans in the Windy City. The issues King focused on have not disappeared. The
Chicago Freedom Movement was modeled after King’s nonviolent direct action approach
that worked so effectively in the South, however Mayor Richard J. Daley’s entrenched
political machine proved to be too powerful.
The Chicago Freedom Movement represented a shift in the civil rights movement
from legal segregation to spatial segregation. The civil rights movement began to focus
on social, political, and economic inequalities instead of legal segregation and
discrimination. Most legal forms of segregation and discrimination in Chicago had been
eliminated by the 1950s but de facto segregation, or segregation not mandated by law,
still existed in housing and education. African Americans attended inferior schools, had
higher rates of poverty and unemployment, and lived in worse housing.1 The movement
focused on a whole range of African American issues. Leaders asked the CHA to
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rehabilitate projects, increase police protection, provide better access to childcare, and
implement a scattered site-housing program. Open housing was a central demand of the
Chicago Freedom Movement.
After a series of open housing marches across the city, Mayor Richard J. Daley
and King announced an agreement in August 1966. The open housing marches through
white neighborhoods would stop and city leaders would promote fair housing.2 The hope
was to make Chicago an open city. City leaders failed to follow through on their end of
the bargain and Chicago remained a divided city. African Americans still lived in worse
housing, attended poor schools, and had higher unemployment.
Many observers consider the Chicago Freedom Movement a failure. It did not
draw national outrage, force landmark legislation, or strengthen the civil rights
movement.3 While the movement’s demand for fair housing was similar to the southern
plea for equal treatment, “whites everywhere dismissed it as an illegitimate demand that
threatened their right to basic, private decisions, about the disposal of their property and,
even more menacingly, threatened the quality of their neighborhoods.”4 When African
Americans started campaigning for open housing, better schools, and more employment,
white resistance intensified. Segregation in the public sphere was not permitted but when
it came down to the private issue of the home and neighborhood, whites once again felt
threatened by the surge of African Americans and reacted violently.
While the Chicago Freedom Movement may have failed to open a divided city,
the Gautreaux lawsuit represented a more effective, if not lengthy, attempt to end de
2

The Electronic Encyclopedia of Chicago, s.v. “Martin Luther King Jr.”
James R. Ralph Jr., Northern Protest: Martin Luther King, Jr., Chicago, and the Civil
Rights Movement, (Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1993), 234.
4
Ibid., 220.
3

125

facto segregation. Over ten years, the lawsuit ended the Chicago Housing Authority’s
pattern of discriminatory public housing developments, removed the city council’s veto
power over CHA sites allowing scattered site projects, and successfully argued before the
Supreme Court that public housing in the suburbs was legal in order to remedy
discrimination that occurred in the city. Additionally, the Gautreaux program moved
thousands of low-income African Americans from deteriorating CHA projects to
federally subsidized private apartments in the suburbs. A celebrated study in 1991
revealed that relocated residents were more likely to finish high school, attend college,
and be employed than residents who stayed in the city.5 Moving pubic housing residents
out of the inner city to a healthier environment in the suburbs had the potential to be an
effective anti-poverty program.
A follow up study on the Gautreaux program by the federal government produced
disturbing results. Researchers found the sample size of the first Gautreaux study was
small. Only around 100 families participated and they were heavily screened. Ideal
circumstances provided glowing results. The new study showed that women who moved
to the suburbs had lower levels of depression and obesity, but were still unlikely to find
jobs. The schools in the suburbs were just as bad and the children were not likely to stay
in them. Residents felt isolated from their old community and social networks.6 The
residents felt better about their living environment but were not more likely to move out
of poverty. Relocating residents out of public housing developments did not seem to help
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lift them out of poverty. Their new communities had the same problems as the inner city
public housing developments.
In the 1990s, Chicago began demolishing high-rise developments as part of the
CHA’s Plan for Transformation. Notorious projects like Cabrini Green and the Robert
Taylor Homes had to be demolished. These infamous projects were plagued with
infrastructural problems, gangs, poverty, drugs, and social dysfunction. When the
infamous towers finally came down, residents were relocated to neighborhoods across the
city.7 Many of their new neighborhoods were hardly better than the projects they left
behind. Residents who used the HUD Section 8 vouchers often chose neighborhoods with
low rents and high crime rates. Concentrated poverty, violence, gangs, and inferior
schools were still problems. The neighborhoods were already in decline when they
moved. Scattering public housing residents across the city did not seem to improve their
environment.8
The recent spike in gun violence in Chicago has some experts examining if there
could be a connection with housing policy. As projects are coming down in the inner city,
crime is moving outward and destabilizing the surrounding areas. In Chicago, suburbs to
the north and west saw a spike in crime rates after CHA projects were demolished.9
Gangs controlled the drug trafficking in individual projects and when the towers came
down, their territory was disrupted. With the demand concentrated in the towers, gangs
had a steady market for drugs. When the towers were demolished, they were forced to
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fight with other gangs for new territory. Instead of concentrating gun crime and drug
trafficking in high-rise projects, these problems became dispersed citywide.
Neighborhoods with a higher density of relocated public housing residents saw violent
crime increase by 21 percent. Meanwhile, the crime in public housing “transformation”
sites decreased between 2000 and 2008. Across the city, violent crime decreased by a net
of one percent and gun crime decreased by 4.4 percent. Basically, there has been a major
decline in specific public housing neighborhoods, a minor decline citywide, and an
increase in specific neighborhoods with a high number of relocated residents.10
Dispersing the problems concentrated in public housing has produced deadly
results. More people were killed in Chicago in 2012 than U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.11
Over one night in August 2012, nineteen people were shot and thirteen were shot in a
thirty-minute period across the West and South sides. One incident occurred at the
CHA’s Ida B. Wells/Darrow Homes complex. Over Memorial Day weekend in May
2012, ten people were murdered.12 Violent news in Chicago is no longer shocking. While
it is important to note that poverty and the recent foreclosure crisis has also played a role
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in perpetuating violence, housing policy is an often-ignored part of Chicago’s gun crime
problem.
Racial and economic segregation remains an issue in Chicago today. A recent
study by the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research declared Chicago the most
segregated big city in the United States.13 Despite declines in the past decade, Chicago
still has the highest levels of racial and economic segregation in the nation. The high
density of people who live there accentuates the poverty, unemployment, inferior schools,
and crime. Chicago is paying for its past discriminatory and segregationist housing
policies in the manifestation of gun violence and crime. What the story of the CHA
reveals is that a well-intentioned effort to clear the slums and house low-income people
failed. The result is an extremely segregated city. It took decades to build the current
African American ghettos in Chicago and it will take even longer to dismantle them.
Until this happens, the nation and Chicago will continue to exist, in the infamous words
of the Kerner Report as, “two societies, one black, one white, – separate and unequal.”14
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Chicago Tribune.
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played a prominent role in covering the site selection controversy of 1949-1950.
Meyerson, Martin, and Edward C. Banfield. Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest:
The Case of Public Housing in Chicago. London: The Free Press, 1955.
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to clear the city’s slums. Martin Meyerson and Edward Banfield, two Chicago
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housing while relieving the city of a massive housing crisis. Politics, Planning,
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exploded across the nation in 1967. Citing lack of economic opportunity as
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consequences for the nation if racial inequality was not addressed. The report
advised more housing construction, job creation, and to end de facto segregation
in the nation’s cities in order to remedy the problem. Warning that the, “nation is
moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal,” the
Kerner Commission’s findings reflected issues still relevant in American society
today.
Polikoff, Alexander. Waiting for Gautreaux: A Story of Segregation, Housing, and the
Black Ghetto. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2006.
Polikoff, a lawyer with Business and Professional People for the Public Interest,
writes an absorbing, depressing, and passionate account of the court case
Gautreaux v. CHA that would end Chicago’s discriminatory pattern of public
housing. His work begins with the first effort to end the CHA’s discriminatory
public housing construction solely in African American neighborhoods before

131

becoming a national lawsuit against the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Arguing before the Supreme Court that public housing in the
suburbs was necessary to remedy the CHA’s discrimination, Polikoff’s epic legal
journey is an inspiration to the power of individual determination to achieve
change through the democratic system.
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relocation from public housing, the article is a reflective piece on the history of
the CHA and the struggle to remedy past housing mistakes.
Biles, Roger. “Race and Housing in Chicago.” Journal of the Illinois State Historical
Society (1998-) 94, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 31-38. http://jstor.org/ (accessed January
1, 2013).
Biles, a professor of urban and United States history at Illinois State University,
tells the story of the African American Great Migration and the emergence of a
distinct and enduring ghetto in the South and West Sides of Chicago. Biles
emphasizies that the start of the twentieth century, Chicago was already one of the
nation’s most segregated cities, but the influx of African Americans would harden
racial and class lines. Ultimately, a combination of public policy and private
combined to effectively conceal the African American community.
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Bowly, Devereux Jr. The Poorhouse: Subsidized Housing in Chicago, 1895-1976.
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978.
The work is one of the first examinations of the public housing system in
Chicago. Devereux Bowly Jr., a lawyer and public housing historian, describes
the history of Chicago public housing and why the system has largely failed. By
detailing the decision making and planning behind individual projects, Bowly Jr.
provides a complete history of the Chicago Housing Authority. The writing is
descriptive, scholarly, and chronological. The book confirms the analysis of
Chicago public housing as a well-intentioned program that ultimately failed.
Cronon, William. Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West. New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1991.
This book provides an environmental and ecological perspective on the historical
development of Chicago. Cronon, a History Professor at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, describes how Chicago’s growth and the spread of
capitalism changed the relationship between city and countryside. The intricate
connections between farm and city changed the region’s economy and
transformed the American landscape. The style is flowing and evocative. The
work is a groundbreaking depiction of the complex interactions between city and
countryside allowing Chicago to become a metropolis.
Drake, St. Clair, and Horace R. Cayton. Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a
Northern City. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1945.
This groundbreaking and superlative description of African American life in
Chicago vividly describes, analyzes, and documents nearly every aspect of the
black experience in the city. Based on research conducted in the 1930s, Black
Metropolis examines the social, cultural, and economic facets of African
American life in Chicago. The book is an exhaustive and intensive study,
providing examples of how conditions have changed in Chicago and how they
have not. The style is heavy and analytical. It stands as a landmark work on
African American life.
Fuerst, J.S. When Public Housing Was Paradise: Building Community in Chicago.
Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003.
The work is the product of ten years of research and writing by J.S. Fuerst, the
former Director of Research and Statistics for the Chicago Housing Authority.
Fuerst offers another perspective on public housing that differs from the gang
infested, deteriorating, and ugly developments that have received widespread
notoriety. When the Chicago Housing Authority was created, public housing was
viewed as a means for social mobility. Affordable and attractive units that were
places of community characterized public housing. The book is a compilation of
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interviews with former CHA workers and tenants. Most are African American
that used public housing as an escape from poverty. Fuerst’s work is emotional,
compelling, and transformative and tries to change the negative stereotype
associated with public housing.
Gregory, James N. The Southern Diaspora: How the Great Migrations of Black and
White Southerners Transformed America. Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2005.
Gregory, a professor of history at the University of Washington, illustrates the
significant cultural, political, and economic changes in American society as a
result of the Great Migration. From 1900 to the l970s, twenty million southerners
migrated to the North and West, reshaping their new communities. These
newcomers created the modern civil rights movement and modern conservatism.
Protestant evangelism emerged and popular music was transformed. This book
examines the impact of the Great Migration on American society and is an
outstanding work chronicling the great exodus from the American South.
Grossman, James R. Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great
Migration. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989.
Grossman, an assistant professor of History at the University of Chicago,
brilliantly tells the story of Chicago and the Great Migration. The work is a
product of ten years of research and describes in rich detail the process of
migration from the South to Chicago after World War I. In part one of the book,
Grossman gives a foundation for understanding why black southerners left and
the second part examines their experience in Chicago and concludes that the
migrants’ hope for opportunity and freedom died in the North.
Hirsch, Arnold R. Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
A professor of History at the University of New Orleans School of Urban and
Regional Studies, Hirsch authors one of the most powerful and detailed accounts
of the creation Chicago’s African American ghetto. He describes the processes,
institutions, and actors that worked together to segregate African Americans who
were arriving in large numbers after World War II. Hirsch argues that the Chicago
Housing Authority was hijacked by the city council to clear Chicago’s slums and
rebuild them in the form of high-rise public housing projects called the “second
ghetto.” An informative and fascinating work on Chicago, Making the Second
Ghetto is consumed by the details of neighborhood change and is an essential
work on the segregation and isolation of Chicago’s black community.
Hirsch, Arnold R. “Massive Resistance in the Urban North: Trumbull Park Chicago
1953-1966.” Journal of American History 82, no. 2 (1995): 522-550,
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Hirsch’s article provides an account of an African American family moving into
an all white neighborhood and the ensuing chaos. The Chicago Housing Authority
was slowly integrating the South Deering neighborhood. Their arrival was met
with extreme hostility and violence by whites. African American efforts to attend
church, commute to their jobs, and shop at local grocery stores were impeded.
The situation in the Trumbull Park Homes projects showed the extent of white
violence towards the integration of their neighborhoods. A turning point in the
history of the Chicago Housing Authority, the disturbances at Trumbull Park
revealed massive white resistance to integration.
Holland, Robert A. Chicago in Maps 1612-2002. New York: Rizzoli, 2005.
Holland, a professor of philosophy at Hofstra University, compiles a vibrant
history of Chicago through maps. This cartographic book provides over seventy
maps showing how the city changed throughout its history. Historical descriptions
accompany every map. The diverse illustrations provide a different perspective on
Chicago’s history. The short anecdotes are addressed to any informed reader.
Holt, Glen E., and Dominic A. Pacyga. Chicago: A Historical Guide To The
Neighborhoods The Loop and South Side. Chicago: Chicago Historical Society,
1979.
Pacyga, a professor of History at Columbia College Chicago, and Holt combine to
produce a book describing the historical development of Chicago’s South Side
neighborhoods. They reveal transportation, the stockyards, the park system, and
urban renewal as major factors influencing the evolution of individual
neighborhoods. The book examines each distinct neighborhood on the South Side
as a case study, from Douglas to Back of the Yards. The authors address
themselves to the historian, but any informed reader can gain important
information about Chicago’s South Side communities.
Horton, Carol A. Race and the Making of American Liberalism. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005.
Horton, an independent scholar and Research Associate at Erikson Institute in
Chicago, examines the historical connections between race and progressive
liberalism. This historical account describes the evolution of liberalism in
American history and the movement’s record on racial equality. Surprisingly, the
progressive record on racial equality is mixed. Horton portrays liberalism as a
force that both liberated and supported racial hierarchy. She concludes by arguing
for a new conception of race and class identity in order to understand
socioeconomic inequality.
Hunt, D. Bradford. Blueprint for Disaster: The Unraveling of Chicago Public Housing.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009.
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Hunt, a professor of social science and history at Roosevelt University in
Chicago, tells the long tale of the destruction of Chicago public housing. The
book examines the history of Chicago public housing from the New Deal to
Richard M. Daley’s 21st century “Plan for Transformation.” An integral part of
this story is the transformation of the Chicago Housing Authority from a
progressive agency to the keeper of the city’s slums and builder of high-rise social
disasters. Hunt concludes that public housing’s inability to compete with the
private market, fiscal mismanagement, and structural flaws combined to create a
system where poverty, crime, and social disorder were rampant.
Hunt, D. Bradford. “What Went Wrong With Public Housing in Chicago?” Journal of the
Illinois State Historical Society 94, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 96-123. http://jstor.org
(accessed January 1, 2013).
Hunt continues to examine the failure of public housing in Chicago in this article.
A combination of anti-public housing forces such as racist politicians that
interfered with site selection, real estate agents that blocked construction, income
limits, and poorly designed structures all led to the decline of the CHA. Hunt,
however, uncovers new research showing that the progressive leaders of the
CHA, motivated by a well-intentioned desire to clear the slums, intended to build
the same high-rise disasters that would eventually be the CHA’s downfall.
Kadar, Marlene. Jeanne Perreault, and Linda Warley, ed. Photographs, Histories, and
Meanings. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
The editors of the book compile a number of accounts about the meaning,
interpretations, and impacts of photography in society. One of these collections is
about the promise of public housing in Chicago. The work shows photographs of
African American slums in Chicago and how these images shaped the political
discourse for public housing. The Chicago Housing Authority used photographs
to present a stark contrast between deteriorating slums and modern public housing
units. The authors of this account argue that public housing held great promise as
a vehicle for social mobility. Unfortunately, through mismanagement and social
disorder, Chicago public housing failed its residents. The section of the book on
Chicago public housing is a fascinating cross section of the power of photography
to portray the housing conditions of the poor.
Lemann, Nicholas. The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How it Changed
America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.
Lemann’s book on the African American Great Migration is one of the most
important accounts of this great demographic shift. A journalist and graduate of
Harvard University, Lemann describes the migration of rural southern African
Americans from the South to the urban North on a personal level. Lemann moves
between Clarksdale, Mississippi, Chicago, and Washington D.C., to tell a story of
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the forces that confined African Americans to poverty and ghettos in the North. A
New York Times bestseller, The Promised Land is a clear call to end the undo the
forces that created the African American ghetto and remedy the nation’s past
racism.
Meyerson, Martin, and Edward C. Banfield. Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest:
The Case of Public Housing in Chicago. London: The Free Press, 1955.
After World War II, Chicago faced a housing crisis and the Chicago Housing
Authority was at the center of the effort to rebuild the city’s slums. Martin
Meyerson and Edward Banfield, two Chicago city planners, describe the Chicago
Housing Authority’s quest to integrate public housing while relieving the city of a
massive housing crisis. Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest is an intimate
and descriptive account of the politicians, reformers, and institutions involved in
the public housing site selection process controversy of 1949-1950 that effectively
ended scattered site public housing construction in Chicago.
Pacyga, Dominic A. Chicago: A Biography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
Historian Dominic Pacyga traces the history of Chicago in this fascinating and
compelling biography of the city. From the city’s foundation in the 19th century,
to industrial expansion, to massive ethnic immigration, to the world wars and the
Great Depression, Pacyga covers hundreds of years of Chicago history in great
detail. Influential actors such as Jane Addams and Richard J. Daley make brief
appearances. This work is an ambitious and powerful account of the city’s great
rise and the people and events that defined the city.
Philpott, Thomas L. The Slum and the Ghetto Neighborhood Deterioration and MiddleClass Reform, Chicago 1880-1930. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.
Philpott, an associate professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin,
produces a work recounting the differences between poor white ethnic social
mobility and African Americans in Chicago. Many impoverished white
immigrants were able to move out of poverty and into the middle class, but
African Americans did not. Philpott argues that the riots of 1919 forced reformers
to address the Black Belt slums. Instead of fostering social mobility out of the
ghetto, reformers contained African Americans to the slums. The progressive
movement for racial equality is examined and Philpott’s findings are similar to
Carol Horton’s Race and the Making of American Liberalism. The work is an
outstanding analysis of the slum and ghetto and the means by which occupants
escaped or were restricted.
Ralph Jr., James R. Northern Protest: Martin Luther King, Jr., Chicago, and the Civil
Rights Movement. Cambridge Massachusetts and London England: Harvard
University Press: 1993.
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Ralph Jr., an Associate Professor of History at Middlebury College, describes the
civil right’s movement’s turn from legal segregation in the South to spatial
segregation in the urban North. He describes how an unprecedented assault on
economic and racial inequality in Chicago led to the downfall of the civil rights
movement. By pushing for equality in housing, education, and employment, the
Chicago Freedom Movement actually undermined the public consensus fueling
the civil rights movement.
Reed, Christopher Robert. The Chicago NAACP and the Rise of Black Professional
Leadership 1910-1966. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997.
The work is a product of several years of research and individual experience in
Chicago, by Robert Christopher Reed, a professor of history at Roosevelt
University. The book describes the evolution of the Chicago branch of the
NAACP through two world wars, the Great Depression and the beginning of the
civil rights movement. Significant time is spent examining the black professional
leadership and African American civic life. Reed also reveals divisions within the
NAACP over the pursuit of integration. The style is deep and scholarly and is
addressed primarily to the historian.
Rosin, Hanna. “American Murder Mystery.” The Atlantic, July/August 2008,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07/american-murdermystery/306872/2/ (accessed, 11 February 2013).
Rosin’s article describes deeply concerning phenomena seen across American
cities. As public housing developments are being demolished, crime is being
pushed outward into suburban areas. She describes the personal stories of several
individuals in Memphis, Tennessee and their experience moving from public
housing to private apartments subsidized by HUD’s Section 8 voucher program.
The unfortunate assessment of this housing policy is that while residents may live
in better environments, they are not more likely to move out of poverty.
Satter, Beryl. Family Properties: Race, Real Estate, and the Exploitation of Black Urban
America. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009.
Satter, chair of the Department of History at Rutgers University, argues that the
true causes of the black ghetto were not black pathology, white flight, or the
culture of poverty, but institutionalized legal and financial exploitation. Satter
describes the work of her father, Mark J. Satter, a lawyer who fought back against
the discriminatory practices. The style is expressive and the story of legal real
estate discrimination is depressing. Satter’s book is a disturbing and
simultaneously powerful story of the real estate practices that shaped African
American segregation.
Spear, Allan H. Black Chicago: The Making of A Ghetto 1890-1920. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1967.
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Spear, a historian and former Minnesota State Senator, explains how the
fluctuating race relations in Chicago in 1890-1920 developed into a stiff and
unyielding ghetto that separated African Americans. The profound changes in
Chicago were a result of white hostility, prejudice, and even some of the decisions
made by African American leaders. The style is addressed to the scholar but still
describes the creation of the ghetto in ways anyone can understand. Spear’s book
provides an effective and descriptive account of the early years of Chicago’s
African American ghetto.
Tuttle Jr., William M. Race Riot Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919. New York:
Atheneum, 1972.
The work is a product of several years of study by William Tuttle Jr., a Senior
Fellow in Negro History at Johns Hopkins University. This vivid work describes
the events of the Chicago race riot in 1919 that ensued after a young black
teenager was drowned in Lake Michigan. Tuttle reveals that the origins of the riot
were deep animosity between whites and blacks. Taking an approach that
emphasizes the individual’s role in the uprising, the author attempts to provide the
reasons and causes behind the riots. He concludes by emphasizing that white
racism and prejudice, the primary causes of the riot, were beginning to manifest in
cities throughout the nation after World War I.
Wyly, Elvin K. and Daniel J. Hammel. “Capital’s Metropolis: Chicago and the
Transformation of American Housing Policy.” Geografiska Annaler. Series B,
Human Geography 82, No. 4 (2000): 181-206. http://jstor.org/ (accessed January
1, 2013).
In this wide ranging and scholarly article, Wyly and Hammel explore the
evolution of American housing policy through the Chicago. By examining
reinvestment, housing finance, and public housing, the article provides an
economic and historical context to Chicago’s inner city housing problems. The
authors delve into Chicago’s history of African American migration through the
twentieth century and how a combination of white racism, sustained immigration,
and urban renewal worked to restrict housing options for African Americans.
They point to the CHA’s policy of building isolated high-rise structures as a
primary reasons for its housing policy failures.
Yale Law Journal Inc. “Public Housing and Urban Policy: Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority.” 79, no. 4 (March 1970): 712-729. http://jstor.org (accessed March 4,
2013).
This article by the Yale Law Journal describes the legal arguments involved in
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority and argues the judiciary overstepped its
authority. By ordering scattered site public housing in white neighborhoods,
Judge Richard B. Austin did not recognize the limitations of the court to influence
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housing policy. The article makes clear that Austin’s order was short sighted and
did not recognize the realities of race and housing in Chicago. Public housing was
needed in African American neighborhoods and his order effectively ended
construction in these areas until projects were built in white neighborhoods.
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